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THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION TO THE UNITED 
STATES: A REASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY 
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS AND 
THE CHEROKEE INDIANS 
JASON C. NELSON* 
Perhaps no event in the modern era has been more profoundly 
consequential than the European “discovery” of the Americas. . . . 
Over a succession of generations, Europeans devised rules intended 
to justify the dispossession and subjugation of the native peoples . . . .  
Of these rules, the most fundamental were those governing the 
ownership of land.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, long before the 
end of slavery, many American Indians (Indians) lost vast land 
holdings on the eastern coast of the United States.2  For instance, 
consider the removal of the so-called “Five Civilized Tribes”—the 
Cherokee, Choctaw, Seminole, Chickasaw, and Muscogee—from the 
southeastern United States.3  Professor Robert Clinton has analogized 
the removal of these indigenous peoples to the Nazi relocation of 
Jewish populations from all over Europe.4  This analogy is 
appropriate, not only because the Indians lost their real and personal 
property, but also because many of them lost their lives.  For 
example, an estimated four thousand Cherokees died from hunger, 
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 1. LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW ix (2005). 
 2. Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a 
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 83 (1993). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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exposure, and disease in the well known “Trail of Tears,” when 
President Andrew Jackson defied the Supreme Court and forced 
Cherokees to relocate to Indian Territory.5  Such egregious acts of 
territorial expropriation did not cease in the nineteenth century, but 
have continued into the modern era.  Tribes such as the Cayuga and 
Oneida of New York, and the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot of 
Maine have lost significant tribal land holdings in contemporary 
times.6  In numerous cases, these property losses occurred via the 
unilateral acts of state governments, and often violated treaties that 
date back to the colonial period.7  As a result, a plethora of Indian 
land claims have surfaced in recent decades, as Indians are granted 
standing to redress these wrongs.8 
Yet, not all Indian land losses have achieved the notoriety of the 
removal of the Five Civilized Tribes.  For instance, long before the 
Trail of Tears—in the year 1775—Judge Richard Henderson 
negotiated the “Transylvania purchase,” which illegally deprived the 
Cherokees of a substantial amount of land in what is now Kentucky.9  
Although the state of Virginia eventually recognized the sale of this 
land was void under its preemption law, it did not return the land to 
the Cherokees; the state retained the land and retroactively 
designated Judge Henderson as the “state’s purchasing agent.”10  This 
example is but one of many historical instances in which individual 
tribes were wrongfully dispossessed of their lands.  Today, many of 
these same tribes dwindle on the edge of extinction—lacking federal 
or state recognition—as they struggle to maintain a cultural identity.  
One such tribe that repeatedly attempted to reclaim its lands and 
heritage is the Tsalagiyi Nvdagi (translated as “Cherokee in Texas”),11 
which settled in Texas territory around 1820.12 
 
 5. Cherokee Nation, A Brief History of the Trail of Tears, http://www.cherokee.org/ 
home.aspx?section=culture&culture=culinfo&cat=R2OKZVC/B7c=&ID=aZ38KzfgbsI= (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2006).  For those interested in exploring the illegal nature of the Cherokees’ 
forced removal, see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 596 (1832) (the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the removal of the Cherokees to Indian Territory was unconstitutional). 
 6. Clinton, supra note 2, at 83. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 84. 
 9. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 14-15. 
 10. Id. at 15. 
 11. D. L. Utsidihi Hicks et al., History of the Tsalagiyi Nvdagi, TSALAGIYI NVDAGI: 
CHEROKEE IN TEXAS, http://www.texascherokees.org/history.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006); 
see also Carol A. Lipscomb, Cherokee Indians, in THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, 
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/CC/bmc51.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2006). 
 12. See MARY WHATLEY CLARKE, CHIEF BOWLES AND THE TEXAS CHEROKEES 3 (1971). 
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The Texas Cherokees (Cherokees or Tribe) spent nearly two 
decades living at peace in the region, under both the governments of 
Mexico and the Republic of Texas, before being driven from their 
homes and land by force in 1839, and losing their leadership in the 
process.13  Over the next century and beyond, the Cherokees 
unsuccessfully tried to reorganize as a tribal entity and promulgate 
legal claims for their expropriated land.14  Regrettably, their pursuits 
were unsuccessful.  Nevertheless, the Cherokees remained 
unwavering in their quest to regain tribal sovereignty, and in August 
of 1993, a group met to reinstate the Tribe.15  In the words of the 
elected Chief D.L. Utsidihi Hicks:  “We who have come together to 
reinstate our tribe are very proud people.  We will last as long as 
there is a drop of Ani-Tsalagi [Cherokee] blood left among us.”16  
Without question, the Cherokees had a right to reconstitute their 
tribe for cultural preservation, but the question remains as to whether 
the Cherokees have a viable legal claim to the expropriated territory. 
To address this question, the following analysis considers 
whether the Cherokees had a valid and binding treaty that was 
negotiated with the Republic of Texas in 1836,17 and if so, whether the 
U.S. government violated international principles of state succession 
when it annexed the Republic of Texas in 1845 and failed to act as a 
successor-in-interest to this treaty obligation.  In order to properly 
evaluate this two-part claim, this Article will proceed through five 
Parts.  In Part I, the Article summarizes the history of the Cherokees 
in Texas, including their migration to the territory, the Tribe’s 
permanent settlement, and their execution of a land treaty with the 
Republic of Texas, which was allegedly breached (spurring the 
Cherokee War).  Next, Part II analyzes the validity of the Cherokees’ 
treaty under both domestic and international law.  In Part III, the 
analysis discusses the United States’ annexation of the Republic of 
Texas in 1845 and evaluates whether the United States had an 
obligation to succeed to the treaty under international principles of 
 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 121-25. 
 15. Hicks, supra note 11. 
 16. Tsalagiyi Nvdagi: Cherokee in Texas, http://www.texascherokees.org (last visited Jan. 
23, 2006).  The reader should note that the Cherokees led by Chief D.L. Utsidihi Hicks are not 
the only Cherokee band in Texas.  In fact, there are several other groups that claim Cherokee 
heritage.  Notwithstanding, the Hicks’ band appears to be the largest and best organized group 
in the state. 
 17. DIANNA EVERETT, THE TEXAS CHEROKEES: A PEOPLE BETWEEN TWO FIRES, 1819-
1840, 71 (1990). 
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state succession.  Next, Part IV considers whether the Cherokees’ 
inchoate right to the land that they inhabited matured into perfect 
title, and if so, whether the Tribe should have been able to pursue a 
claim of title to the land under the doctrine of adverse possession.  
Finally, Part V explores the continued failure of the United States to 
acknowledge the Cherokees’ claim and considers if this stance 
offends international sentiments on the treatment of indigenous 
peoples.  The Conclusion then sums up the Article’s findings, 
shortcomings, and implications, and offers potential solutions to the 
present-day Cherokees. 
I.  AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF THE TEXAS CHEROKEES 
A comprehensive account of the Cherokee migration to Texas, 
and the subsequent events that transpired, is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Nevertheless, an abbreviated historical account is required in 
order to place the legal issues that are at the crux of this analysis in 
the proper context, especially for those who are unfamiliar with Texas 
history.  This summary does not purport to do justice to the struggles 
faced by the Cherokees and other affiliated tribes during this 
turbulent historical period.  Instead, it serves only to provide the 
nescient student of Texas history with helpful background on the 
allegedly broken Cherokee treaty.18 
The Cherokees19 call themselves the Ani-Yunwiya, which means 
“principal people.”20  Indeed, the Cherokees were arguably worthy of 
this title as one of the principal tribal nations in the southeastern 
United States before their nineteenth century removal21:  they 
occupied parts of Alabama, Georgia, North and South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Virginia.22  When the first white men ventured into 
Cherokee territory in the sixteenth century, the Cherokees had 
approximately sixty-four towns and villages, roughly six thousand 
 
 18. For a contemporary historical account of the Texas Cherokees, see id.  For additional 
accounts, see CLARKE, supra note 12; Hicks et al., supra note 11; Lipscomb, supra note 11.  For 
one of the earliest historical accounts of the Texas Cherokees, see EMMET STARR, HISTORY OF 
THE CHEROKEE INDIANS 187-224 (Jack Gregory and Rennard Strickland eds., Indian Heritage 
Ass’n 1967) (1921). 
 19. The word Cherokee is derived from two words:  a-che-la, meaning “fire,” and ah-gi, 
meaning “he takes.”  CLARKE, supra note 12, at 4  (citing Albert Woldert, The Last of the 
Cherokees in Texas, and The Life and Death of Chief Bowles, in 1 CHRONICLES OF OKLAHOMA, 
NO. 2, at 179-226 (1921-1923)). 
 20. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 4. 
 21. Id. 
 22. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 4. 
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warriors,23 and numbered around sixteen thousand people.24  Over the 
next two centuries, economic expansionism and colonization in North 
America put tremendous pressure on the Cherokees, as well as all 
native peoples, in the areas of trade, military alliances, and territorial 
concessions.25  Notwithstanding, the Cherokees proved to be an 
adaptive tribe:  new and useful material objects, new people, and even 
new ideas were adapted to fit Cherokee ways.26 
As European empire building continued during the eighteenth 
century, wars, epidemics, and food shortages plagued the Cherokees 
and resulted in a chronically shrinking population and territory.27  
These issues arose as the tribe was fractionalized, which meant the 
Cherokees could not produce a united front before their enemies.28  
Thus, by 1791, the Cherokees were defeated militarily, and had 
negotiated a treaty with the nascent U.S. government in which the 
United States stated its intention to “civilize” the Tribe.29  After 1794, 
Indian agents also coaxed many Cherokees into farming for their 
livelihoods, which further dislocated the Cherokee community, both 
socially and culturally.30  From this period through 1810, continuing 
pressure for social change, along with concomitant pressure from the 
United States for additional land cessions, prompted the development 
of more significant factions within the Tribe.31  As a result, many 
Cherokees decided to cross the Mississippi River to preserve what 
remained of their traditional culture and way of life.32 
One departing sect, headed by Chief John Bowles33 (also known 
as “Duwali” and “Bold Hunter”34), decided to make its home in the 
valley of the St. Francis River, which was in the French territory of 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 5. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 5-6. 
 29. Id. at 6.  The agreement negotiated with the Cherokees—the Treaty of Holston 
(1791)—was meant to create a perpetual peace and friendship between the United States and 
the Cherokee Nation.  See Treaty of Holston, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, pmbl., July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 
39, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 29 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904). 
 30. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 6. 
 31. Id. at 9. 
 32. Id. 
 33. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 8. 
 34. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 10. 
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Missouri35 (present-day Missouri and Arkansas36).  Bowles was joined 
by another headman, Saulowee (also known as “Tsulawi” or “Fox”), 
and later by another prominent chief, Talontuskee.37  In 1811, a great 
earthquake struck this fertile region, and Chief Bowles moved his 
people out of the valley and further into Arkansas territory.38  Bowles’ 
new settlement was at the mouth of Petit Jean Creek, an area about 
four miles from the Arkansas River, near the present-day city of 
Perryville, Arkansas.39  Because this territory was virgin hunting 
ground and free of white settlers, other Cherokees soon joined them.40  
In fact, by 1813, perhaps one-third of the “Eastern” Cherokees were 
living west of the Mississippi.41  Unfortunately, these new “Western” 
Cherokees would face the arrival of white settlers in a few short 
years.42  Furthermore, when the United States ceded land to the 
Cherokee Nation of Arkansas in 1819, Chief Bowles’ village was in an 
area that was not included in the land cession and he and his people 
were forced to move once again.43 
Many Cherokees, Delawares, Creeks, and Choctaws had settled 
in a region called “Lost Prairie,”44 which was an area about twenty 
miles east of present-day Texarkana, Arkansas.45  Chief Bowles and 
his tribe probably joined these Indians briefly after leaving 
Arkansas,46 while Bowles’ eventual move into Texas was likely 
preceded by “hunting sojourns to the buffalo prairie of the Brazos 
River region.”47  In short, Bowles liked what he saw in this new 
country, and he believed that the Cherokees “could live in peace 
under the Spanish government in Texas,” as they had done under the 
 
 35. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 11-12.  Chief Bowles was involved in an altercation with 
white settlers where many were killed, though it was not clear he was at fault.  Id. at 9-12.  
Nonetheless, because the Cherokee were at peace with the U.S. government, he fell into 
disfavor with many of the Cherokee Nation.  Id. at 11.  By fleeing into French territory, Bowles 
felt that he and his followers would be safe.  Id. at 11-12. 
 36. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 10. 
 37. Id. at 10-11. 
 38. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 13. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See EVERETT, supra note 17, at 13. 
 41. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 13. 
 42. See EVERETT, supra note 17, at 17. 
 43. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 13. 
 44. Id. at 14. 
 45. Id. (citing Woldert, supra note 19, at 190). 
 46. Id. 
 47. STANLEY W. HOIG, THE CHEROKEES AND THEIR CHIEFS 177 (1998). 
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French government in Missouri.48  Hence, during the winter of 1819-
20,49 Bowles relocated about one hundred warriors and two hundred 
women and children to an area known as “Three Forks of the 
Trinity,” which is within the city limits of modern-day Dallas.50  
Regrettably, Bowles and his people were forced to abandon the 
settlement following a number of conflicts with the Prairie Tribes, in 
which the Cherokees suffered heavy casualties.51  Bowles retreated to 
the dense forests of East Texas and established a new village near 
Nacogdoches.52  Over time, Chief Bowles’s people were joined by 
other displaced Cherokee bands, and they linked up with other 
refugee Indians to form a “loose confederacy”; these Indians included 
the Biloxis, Shawnees, Delawares, Kickapoos, Choctaws, Alabamas, 
and Coushattas.53  However, the “Cherokees were the largest and 
most important band,” and Chief Bowles was regarded as the chief of 
them all.54 
Yet Bowles did not remain chief in Texas for long, as he was 
soon replaced by Richard Fields, an educated man of mixed blood.55  
There is no consensus as to why Bowles was replaced by Fields, but it 
is possible that the Cherokees believed Fields would be better able to 
negotiate rights to Texas land from the Mexican government.56  In 
1822, the Cherokees met with the provincial governor in San 
Antonio, and entered into a treaty whereby the Cherokees agreed to 
subject themselves to Spanish laws as citizens, and “[i]n return they 
were granted the right to [peacefully] reside in Texas.”57  Regrettably, 
the provincial governor did not have the right to make land grants.58  
Instead, he issued Fields, Bowles, and several other companions a 
 
 48. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 14. 
 49. Id. 
 50. HOIG, supra note 47. 
 51. Id.  For further reading on the Prairie Tribes, see AKE HULTKRANTZ, PRAIRIE AND 
PLAINS INDIANS (1997), as well as MICHAEL JOHNSON, NATIVE TRIBES OF THE PLAINS AND 
PRAIRIE (2004). 
 52. HOIG, supra note 47, at 177 (citing Woldert, supra note 19, at 190). 
 53. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 17 (citing James Mooney, Myths of the Cherokee, 
NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY, Pt. I, 141 
(1900)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 18 (citing Dorman H. Winfrey, Chief Bowles of the Texas 
Cherokee, 32 CHRONICLES OF OKLAHOMA, NO. 1, at 31 (1954)).  Notably, Chief Bowles was 
also a mixed-blood Indian; he was rumored to be half-Scottish.  Id. at 7-8. 
 56. HOIG, supra note 47, at 178. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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permit to travel to Mexico City to seek a colonial land grant from the 
Mexican government.59 
The Cherokees’ trip to Mexico City took place at an inopportune 
time, as a revolution and change in the leadership of Mexico occurred 
during the spring of 1823.60  Thus, despite having been promised a 
grant of land, “the Mexican colonization laws that were passed in 
1824 and 1825 failed to include the Cherokees.”61  Rather, the land 
the Cherokees claimed was granted to a “disgruntled” American 
colonist who was in the process of inspiring a revolution against the 
government of Mexico.62  Chief Fields was angry at the turn of events, 
and he threatened to join the Comanches and other tribes in North 
Texas resisting Mexican control.63 
In 1825, John Dunn Hunter—a writer who had much experience 
chronicling the western Indians—arrived at the Cherokees’ village.64  
Hunter was keenly interested in Indian affairs, and whatever his true 
intentions were in coming to Texas, he was well-liked by Chief Fields.  
Fields, in fact, commissioned Hunter to travel to Mexico City in 
another effort to secure Cherokee title to Texas land.65  The trip was 
unsuccessful, and upon his return, Hunter convinced the Cherokees 
that the Mexican government had contempt for them.66  Though the 
Cherokees were ready to go to war, Hunter convinced the Tribe to 
instead join a rebellion incited by Hayden Edwards,67 a man that had 
been granted a contract by the Mexican government to settle families 
in Texas.68  Joining Edwards’s short-lived independence surge—which 
became known as the “Fredonian Rebellion”—proved to be a 
deleterious move for Hunter and Fields because the Mexican army, 
joined by a Texas militia commanded by Stephen F. Austin, moved to 
 
 59. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 27. 
 60. HOIG, supra note 47, at 178.  For further reading on the history of Mexico, see THE 
OXFORD HISTORY OF MEXICO (Michael C. Meyer & William H. Beezley eds., 2000). 
 61. HOIG, supra note 47, at 179. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 30. 
 65. HOIG, supra note 47, at 180. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 37 (citing EUGENE C. BARKER, LIFE OF STEPHEN F. 
AUSTIN, FOUNDER OF TEXAS, 1793-1836: A CHAPTER IN THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT OF THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN PEOPLE, 148-50 (1925)).  See also Archie P. McDonald, Fredonian 
Rebellion, in THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/ 
articles/FF/jcf1.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2006). 
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crush the uprising.69  Edwards and his coterie fled to the safety of 
Louisiana, and both Fields and Hunter were assassinated.70  The 
Cherokee council had ordered the men to be executed for violating 
the community interest to benefit an enemy, which was a decision not 
only consistent with tribal law, but also showed the Mexican 
government that this momentary intransigency was not a disloyal act 
by the Cherokees.71  The strategy proved successful:  the Mexican 
government commended Bowles and Gatunwali (also known as “Big 
Mush”) for their prompt action in the affair.72  In fact, “[t]he Texas 
governor ordered the military command to issue a title for a 
Cherokee land grant,” but “[b]efore this could be done, 
unfortunately, the governor died and the military command was 
changed.”73 
Bowles resumed his post as head of the Cherokee people, and he 
persevered in his efforts to secure title to land.74  In the summer of 
1833, Bowles guided a party of Cherokees to Saltillo—the capital of 
Texas—where he was assured that the land issue would soon be 
resolved.75  Eventually, the government offered the Cherokees land 
through a resolution, but rather than granting them title to the land in 
East Texas that the tribe occupied, the land offered was farther north, 
and was selected strategically to defend Texas against the 
Comanches.76  Understandably, the Cherokees rejected the land 
grant.77  Moreover, by 1835 Texas was in “a state of confusion and 
uncertainty,”78 where “[t]alk of revolution was on every tongue.”79  In 
short, “a new player” had arrived to take part in the impending Texas 
revolution:  Sam Houston, who was a close friend of Chief Bowles.80  
 
 69. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 180-81. 
 70. Id. at 181. 
 71. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 47. 
 72. Id. 
 73. HOIG, supra note 47, at 183. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 69. 
 77. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 183. 
 78. Id. 
 79. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 57. 
 80. HOIG, supra note 47, at 183.  In fact, Sam Houston and Chief Bowles had formerly lived 
within seven miles of one another in Tennessee.  Id. 
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Houston had Indian roots, and was sympathetic to the plight of the 
Cherokees.81 
In November of 1835, delegates convened at San Felipe de 
Austin to establish a provisional government for those seeking 
independence in Texas.82  This convention—referred to as the 
“Consultation”—drafted the “Plan and Powers of the Provisional 
Government of Texas” (Plan and Powers), which created the 
positions of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and General Council, 
established a judiciary, and spelled out the powers of the provisional 
government.83  After completing the Plan and Powers, a resolution 
known as the “Solemn Declaration” was issued on November 13, and 
it was unanimously adopted by the fifty-four members of the 
Consultation.84  The parts pertinent for the Cherokees read as follows: 
Be it solemnly decreed . . . [t]hat the Cherokee Indians, and their 
associate bands, . . . have derived their just claims to lands . . . from 
the government of Mexico, from whom we have also derived our 
rights . . . . 
We solemnly declare, that the boundaries of the claims . . . to the 
land is as follows, to wit:  lying north of the San Antonio road and 
the Neches, and west of the Angelina and Sabine Rivers. 
We solemnly declare, that the governor and the general council, 
immediately on its organization, shall appoint commissioners to 
treat with the said Indians, to establish the definite boundary of 
their territory, and secure their confidence and friendship. 
We solemnly declare, that we will guarantee them the peaceful 
enjoyment of their rights to the lands, as we do our own.85 
 
 81. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 57.  Sam Houston was made a citizen of the Cherokee 
Nation of Arkansas in 1829.  Id. 
 82. HOIG, supra note 47, at 184.  In order to better comprehend the governmental structure 
of the Republic of Texas during its bid for independence, one can view Texas as having 
proceeded through four governments:  an initial Permanent Council, a Consultation, a 
Provisional Government and General Council, and the Constitutional Convention of 1836.  See 
John Cornyn, The Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to Statehood, 26 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1089, 1119 (1995).  It is not possible to address each stage individually in this concise 
historical summary, but the reader is invited to explore this topic further. 
 83. See JOURNALS OF THE CONSULTATION HELD AT SAN FELIPE DE AUSTIN, OCTOBER 
16, 1835 (1838), reprinted in 1 GAMMEL’S THE LAW OF TEXAS 505 (George P. Findlay & D. E. 
Simmons eds., 1906) [hereinafter JOURNALS].  See also Plan and Powers of the Provisional 
Government of Texas, reprinted in 1 GAMMEL’S THE LAW OF TEXAS, supra, at 908, available at 
http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/1836ppindex.html [hereinafter Plan and Powers].  
For a comprehensive account of the early judiciary’s composition in the Republic of Texas and 
thereafter, see James W. Paulsen, The Judges of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 305 (1986). 
 84. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 60-61.  See also JOURNALS, supra note 83, at 546. 
 85. JOURNALS, supra note 83, at 546. 
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Houston, the newly elected commander-in-chief of the Texas army, 
supported the resolution and was thrilled after it was unanimously 
approved.86 
Later that month, Houston and two other emissaries began 
negotiating a treaty with the Cherokees.87  The agreement—known as 
the “Treaty between Texas Commissioners and the Cherokee 
Indians” (Treaty)—was the first pact negotiated by the nascent Texas 
government, and was signed on February 23, 1836.88  Houston and 
Colonel John Forbes signed for the Texas government, and Chief 
Bowles, Big Mush, and six others signed for the Cherokees, 
Shawnees, Delawares, Kickapoos, Quapaws, Buloies, Iowanes, 
Alabamas, Coushattas, Caddoes of Neches, Tamocuttakes, and 
Untanguous.89  The Treaty specified lands to be allocated and settled 
by the Indians, which they agreed to locate within, and also 
established a lasting peace between the Texas government and the 
signatory tribes.90  On February 29, Houston transmitted the Treaty to 
Texas Governor Henry Smith for presentation to the Consultation.91  
Unfortunately, no formal ratifying action was taken on the Treaty 
during this turbulent period,92 as the Texans were in the midst of 
 
 86. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 61. 
 87. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 70. 
 88. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 63. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Treaty between Texas Commissioners and the Cherokee Indians arts. I-II, Rep. of 
Tex.-Cherokees, Feb. 23, 1836, reprinted in 1 GAMMEL’S THE LAW OF TEXAS, supra note 83, at 
204, available at http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/treasures/giants/cherokee-1.html [hereinafter Treaty].  
Article II of the Treaty delimited the boundaries of the Cherokee lands as follows: 
It is agreed and declared that the before named Tribes, or Bands shall form one 
community, and that they shall have and possess the lands, within the following 
bounds.  Towit,—laying West of the San Antonio road, and beginning on the West, at 
the point where the said road crosses the River Angeline, and running up said river, 
until it reaches the mouth of the first large creek, (below the great Shawanee Village) 
emptying into the said River from the north east, thence running with said creek, to its 
main source, and from thence, a due north line to the Sabine River, and with said river 
west—then starting where the San Antonio road crosses the Angeline river, and with 
the said road to the point where it crosses the Naches river and thence running up the 
east side of said river, in a North West direction. 
 Id. 
 91. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 73. 
 92. Id. at 73-74 (explaining that the Consultation did not consider the Treaty); id. at 75 
(explaining that the Constitutional Convention of 1836 did not take action to ratify the Treaty).  
The historian Emmet Starr offers an alternative view to Everett.  More particularly, Starr 
explains that the Treaty was delivered to the Republic of Texas provisional government, as per 
instructions, on February 29, 1836; the documents were subsequently surrendered to the 
Constitutional Convention on March 11.  STARR, supra note 18, at 210.  If the government did 
not approve of the Treaty, which was the purpose of the Consultation, there appears to be no 
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drafting the “Texas Declaration of Independence,” which was 
completed on March 2, 1836,93 and the subsequent “Constitution of 
the Republic of Texas,” which was completed on March 17, 1836.94  
Even so, the bond of friendship between Chief Bowles and Houston 
gave Bowles confidence that Texas would honor the Treaty.95 
On April 21, 1836, the Mexican army was defeated at the historic 
Battle of San Jacinto.96  As the Texas revolution concluded and 
Houston was elected the new President of the Republic of Texas, he 
continued to support the Treaty.97  Yet, there was opposition to the 
Treaty among the Texas citizenry because of general white prejudice 
against Indians, as well as contempt flowing from rumors that the 
Indians were organizing to aid Mexico.98  Notwithstanding this 
opposition, Houston submitted the Treaty to the Senate for 
ratification under the country’s new constitution.99  In the fall of 1837, 
the Senate debated the Treaty at great length, but decided that it was 
null and void.100  The Senate reasoned that the provisional 
government had exceeded its powers in negotiating the Treaty, which 
was not only detrimental to the Republic of Texas, but also violated 
the legal rights of many citizens.101  Moreover, the land encompassed 
under the Treaty was already subject to numerous settled land titles 
and many more were in the process of fulfillment.102  Houston was 
outraged at the Senate’s refusal to ratify the Treaty, and he moved 
forward with his promise to Bowles to mark off a boundary line 
between the Cherokees and whites.103  This action was Houston’s last 
 
record of it (though Starr acknowledges that the government and army were in a perilous state 
of affairs).  See id. 
 93. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS para. 1 (1836), 
available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/1836dindex.html. 
 94. REP. OF TEX. CONST. OF 1836 [hereinafter TEX. CONST.], available at 
http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/1836cindex.html. 
 95. HOIG, supra note 47, at 184.  See also CLARKE, supra note 12, at 67. 
 96. L.W. Kemp, Battle of San Jacinto, in THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, 
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/SS/qes4.html (last visited Jan. 23, 
2006). 
 97. HOIG, supra note 47, at 184-85. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 185. 
 101. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 72. 
 102. Id. 
 103. HOIG, supra note 47, at 185. 
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for the Cherokees; his term expired and he was replaced by President 
Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar.104 
Lamar had migrated to Texas from Georgia, where the “Old 
Nation Cherokees” had been severely treated, and he was adamant 
that the Cherokees must be forced out of Texas.105  With the support 
of the white population, Lamar wasted little time before alleging that 
the Cherokees were plotting with the Mexicans to overthrow the 
Texas government, and that an Indian uprising was a serious 
danger.106  Lamar employed these pretexts as justification to send 
troops into Cherokee territory.107  Understandably, Chief Bowles was 
angered by these accusations, and he threatened to fight if the troops 
remained on Cherokee lands.  But Lamar was unrelenting in his 
decision to stay on, and he sent word to Bowles that the Cherokees 
would be removed from Texas by force if necessary.108  Lamar then 
sent commissioners to meet with the Cherokees, and an agreement 
was proposed for the Cherokees’ eviction from Texas.109  The terms 
were unfavorable to the Cherokees, offering de minimus 
compensation for land improvements and belongings that would be 
left behind, and demanding that the Cherokees surrender the bulk of 
their firearms and leave Texas under an armed escort.110  Bowles did 
not sign the agreement, thereby setting off the “Cherokee War.”111 
When the dust settled, it was clear that the Texas army had easily 
defeated the Cherokees.  Eighty-three year-old Chief Bowles lost his 
life; he was killed by a gunshot to the head at close range.112  Bowles’ 
corpse was mutilated on the battlefield in a ghoulish manner—strips 
of flesh were cut from his back to be used as reins for a horse, and his 
scalp was also taken.113  The captured Cherokees were eventually sent 
to Indian territory, while the others fled to Louisiana, Mexico,114 or 
 
 104. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 76. 
 105. HOIG, supra note 47, at 186-87. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id.; see also STARR, supra note 18, at 213 (“Pretext after pretext was sought in order 
to find some excuse for the sin the government [of Texas] was about to commit upon an 
innocent [Cherokee] people.”). 
 108. HOIG, supra note 47, at 187. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 98-100 (quoting the articles from the agreement that was 
submitted to the Texas Cherokees). 
 111. Id. at 105-06. 
 112. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 108. 
 113. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 110. 
 114. HOIG, supra note 47, at 190. 
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the forests of East Texas.115  When Houston learned about the 
Cherokees’ slaughter and the death of Chief Bowles, he condemned 
the actions publicly, despite threats against his life.116  Regrettably, 
Houston’s public outrage occurred after the tragic climax to the 
Cherokees’ struggle.  Just a few years later, the incident seemed long 
past when the Republic of Texas was annexed by the United States in 
1845.117 
II.  TREATY LAW 
To determine whether the United States should have succeeded 
the Republic of Texas’s obligations under the pact with the 
Cherokees, the legally binding nature of the Treaty must be 
considered.  This point is critical because the Texas Senate concluded 
that the Treaty was invalid.118  Not only was this decision vexing to 
Houston and others in 1837, but it also disturbs modern legal scholars 
today.119  In fact, historians have frequently averred that the Treaty 
was a legally binding document that was properly concluded by the 
Texas provisional government.  For instance, a historian of the era—
Henderson Yoakum—argued that the Texas Senate’s claim that the 
Consultation lacked the authority to pledge land is preposterous.120  
He continued by stating that the “ink was scarcely dry on the treaty 
 
 115. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 108-09.  See also Lipscomb, supra note 11 (“Some 
Cherokees continued to live a fugitive existence in Texas . . . .”). 
 116. HOIG, supra note 47, at 190.  When Sam Houston was elected to a second presidential 
term in 1841, he inaugurated a peace policy with the Indians, and treaties were negotiated in 
1843 and 1844.  Lipscomb, supra note 11. 
 117. TEX. CONST. OF 1845, reprinted in 1 GAMMEL’S THE LAW OF TEXAS, supra note 83, at 
1069, available at http://www.tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/1845index.html.  See also 
generally, S.S. McKay, Constitution of 1845, in THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, 
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/CC/mhc3.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).  
For an analysis as to whether the annexation of Texas was Constitutional, compare Ralph H. 
Brock, The Republic of Texas is No More: An Answer to the Claim that Texas was 
Unconstitutionally Annexed to the United States, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 679 (1997), with Jennifer 
M. L. Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal Analysis of the Illegal 
Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawaii’s Annexation, and Possible Reparations, 17 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 463 (1995). 
 118. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 88. 
 119. See generally Victoria Sutton, American Indian Law—Elucidating Constitutional Law, 
37 TULSA L. REV. 539, 545-46 (2001) (discussing how the United States recognizes pre-
Constitutional treaties with successor-in-interest logic, while a different relationship arises in the 
case of the treaty between the Republic of Texas and the Texas Cherokees). 
 120. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 78 (quoting 2 HENDERSON YOAKUM, HISTORY OF TEXAS 
FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT IN 1685 TO ITS ANNEXATION TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1846, at 
266 (1855)). 
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paper” when Texas began violating the Treaty’s terms:  an accusation 
that land surveyors were in Cherokee territory marking off land for 
settlement long before the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty.121 
Although the facts appear to support the assertion of bad faith 
on the part of the Republic of Texas, a proper determination of the 
merit of the Cherokees’ claim can only be ascertained by employing a 
systematic legal analysis of the Treaty.  First, the analysis must 
determine whether the Treaty was a binding agreement that should 
have been honored under domestic and international law.  If the 
Treaty was indeed valid, a second and more complex question must 
be tackled:  whether the United States should have succeeded to the 
Treaty after it annexed the Republic of Texas pursuant to the 
international law of state succession. 
A. Treaty Validity Under Domestic Law 
When Sam Houston became President of Texas again in 1842,122 
he wrote to Texas Attorney General George Whitfield Terrell to get 
an opinion on the Cherokees’ title to the disputed property in East 
Texas.123  Terrell believed the Treaty was valid for multiple reasons:  
first, the treaty was signed in good faith; and second, the provisional 
government was the only government active in Texas at the time of 
the Treaty’s signing, and thus it was the government de facto.124  This 
conclusion jibed with Houston’s belief that the Consultation had full 
power to treat with the Cherokees, and to assert that it did not was 
nothing more than a pretext to dishonor an otherwise valid 
agreement.125  Upon carefully reviewing the Plan and Powers of the 
provisional government, it appears that both Houston and Terrell 
were correct in their conclusions. 
When the Consultation issued the “Solemn Declaration” in 1835, 
this action represented more than a simple good faith gesture aimed 
at the Indians.126  In reality, the Solemn Declaration was meant to 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. For further reading on Sam Houston, see RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, SAM HOUSTON 
AND THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (2d ed. 2001).  See also, RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, GONE TO 
TEXAS: A HISTORY OF THE LONE STAR STATE (2003); JAMES L. HALEY, SAM HOUSTON 
(2002); MARQUIS JAMES, THE RAVEN: A BIOGRAPHY OF SAM HOUSTON (1988). 
 123. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 78. 
 124. Id. at 78-79. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id., at 60 (stating that one of the “primary duties” of the provisional government 
“was to treat with the Indians regarding their land titles and to secure their friendship if 
possible”). 
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fulfill the obligations of the provisional government enumerated in 
the Plan and Powers.  More particularly, Article III of the Plan and 
Powers stated:  “They [the Governor and General Council] shall have 
power, and it is hereby made the duty of the Governor and Council, 
to treat with the several tribes of Indians concerning their land claims, 
and if possible, to secure their friendship.”127  One of the first 
questions that comes to mind when reading this section of the Plan 
and Powers is why the Governor and General Council would have 
been given a “duty” to treat with the Cherokees and other tribes.  
The answer to this query is straightforward:  the Texans were 
concerned that the Indians would ally with Mexico and fight against 
them.128  In fact, had the Cherokees allied with Mexico, Texans may 
have lost the Battle of San Jacinto.129 
Undoubtedly, the Consultation wanted to settle the Cherokees’ 
land claim to secure Cherokee allegiance to the Texas cause, or at the 
very least, to keep the Cherokees neutral during the coming war with 
Mexico.130  The Consultation made their intentions known by crafting 
specific language in the Plan and Powers that obliged the provisional 
government to treat with the Indians,131 by issuing a grant of territory 
to the Cherokees in the resolution known as the Solemn 
Declaration,132 and by incorporating the Solemn Declaration into the 
Treaty.133  This aim also clarifies why Houston and two other 
emissaries hastily negotiated and executed a binding agreement with 
the Cherokees.134  Accordingly, the critical legal inquiry must focus on 
the provisional government’s intent in treating with the Cherokees, as 
the party’s intent determines whether a treaty requires ratification.135 
Here, the consecutive measures taken by the Texas government 
in an effort to treat with the Cherokees, along with its failure to 
 
 127. Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III. 
 128. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 185.  Accord EVERETT, supra note 17, at 69-70. 
 129. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 120. 
 130. See STARR, supra note 18, at 210 (explaining that Cherokee neutrality was essential 
during the Republic of Texas’s struggle for independence). 
 131. Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III (Article III states that it is “the duty of the 
Governor and Council to treat with the several tribes of Indians concerning their Land 
Claims . . . .”). 
 132. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 60-61.  See also JOURNALS, supra note 83, at 546-47. 
 133. See Treaty, supra note 90, pmbl. (“This Treaty is made conformably to a declaration 
[the Solemn Declaration] made by the last General Consultation, at St. Felipe, and dated 13th 
November A.D. 1835.”). 
 134. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 184. 
 135. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 14, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. 
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include a ratification provision in the Plan and Powers136 and the 
Treaty,137 show that there was no overt expectation of Treaty 
ratification on the government’s behalf.  These points are telling, 
especially given that there was no senatorial body in existence to 
ratify the agreement at the time it was executed.138  As such, the 
evidence plainly quashes any assertion that Senate ratification was 
either intended or required. 
In addition, the Plan and Powers provided the provisional 
government with a variety of other powers, including the ability “to 
contract for loans, . . . to hypothecate the Public Lands, and pledge 
the faith of the Country for the security of the payment.”139  Because 
the Senate did not question the provisional government’s decisions to 
borrow money, or undertake other activities required to secure 
Texas’ independence,140 it seems dubious to argue that the provisional 
government was not empowered to treat with the Indians; the 
language in the Plan and Powers was patently clear in this regard.141  
As such, it seems that Houston may have erred by submitting the 
Treaty to the newly established Senate for ratification after Texas 
declared its independence.142  He probably assumed that a stamp of 
legitimacy would help the Cherokees, but Senate ratification was 
neither required nor intended under the Plan and Powers.143 
Taken as a whole, these findings support the claim of Treaty 
validity by Attorney General Terrell and the historians.  The 
 
 136. Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III (Article III makes it the duty of the provisional 
government to treat with the Indians, though a ratification requirement is not included.). 
 137. See Treaty, supra note 90.  In fact, the terms of the Treaty seem to indicate that the 
agreement was to go into effect upon signing.  Id. arts. 10-11 (describing precise time limits from 
the date of the Treaty within which certain parties must relocate). 
 138. Compare Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. I, with TEX. CONST., supra note 94, art. I. 
 139. Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III. 
 140. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 78 (quoting 3 SAM HOUSTON, THE WRITINGS OF SAM 
HOUSTON 323-47 (Amelia W. Williams & Eugene C. Parker eds., 1938-43)). 
 141. Article III of the Plan and Powers states:  “They [the General Council] shall have 
power, and it is hereby made the duty of the Governor and Council, to treat with the several 
tribes of Indians concerning their Land Claims, and if possible, to secure their friendship.”  Plan 
and Powers, supra note 83, art. III. 
 142. See id. (The provisional government had full authority to treat with the Cherokees.).  
See also generally CLARKE, supra note 12, at 77-79 (explaining that the opinions of historians, 
Sam Houston, and Texas Attorney General G.W. Terrell all agree that the provisional 
government had the power to treat with the Cherokees). 
 143. This supposition may explain why Houston made no further attempt to secure the 
Senate’s ratification during his term as the first president of the Republic of Texas.  See STARR, 
supra note 18, at 211.  Instead, Houston proceeded in marking off the boundaries of the 
Cherokees territory.  See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 73. 
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Republic of Texas was vying for independence, and needed the 
Cherokees’ neutrality.  To secure this neutrality, the government 
crafted targeted language in the Plan and Powers, granted the 
Cherokees territory in the Solemn Declaration, and quickly executed 
the Treaty, an agreement that neither intended nor required the 
Senate’s ratification.  As such, the evidence refutes the Texas Senate’s 
claims that the Treaty was detrimental to the Republic of Texas and 
violated the rights of its citizens.144  The Treaty simply fulfilled the 
provisional government’s obligation to help Texas secure its 
independence,145 as did the provisional government’s other acts, which 
the Senate did not question.  What is more, the Treaty met its 
objective:  the Cherokees’ neutrality proved to be a significant factor 
in Texas winning the war with Mexico.146  Therefore, when all facts 
are considered, the Treaty appears to have been a valid agreement 
under domestic law. 
B. Treaty Validity Under International Law 
Beyond basic rules of domestic law, the Republic of Texas 
should also have been aware of a key principle under international 
law known as “pacta sunt servanda,” which is the idea that states must 
keep their word.147  Pacta sunt servanda has been claimed as a basic 
norm of the law of nations, with a rich history beyond the modern 
context.148  Thinkers throughout the ages, including Socrates, Plato, 
and Cicero, have stressed the concept’s fundamental role in any legal 
system.149  Consequently, this norm was far from novel when Texas 
negotiated the Treaty, though it was apparently given little 
consideration when the Senate decided to abrogate its commitment 
under the agreement.150  In any case, the application of this norm 
connotes that Texas could not terminate the Treaty without suitable 
 
 144. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 71-72. 
 145. Compare Plan and Powers, supra note 83, with Treaty, supra note 90 (the Treaty 
fulfilled this obligation).  See generally HOIG, supra note 47, at 184 (discussing the convention 
that established the Republic of Texas provisional government and its vow to recognize the 
Cherokees’ land claims). 
 146. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 72-73. 
 147. Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 567, 567 (1995). 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See generally CLARKE, supra note 12, at 71-73 (discussing the Senate’s decision to 
nullify the Treaty). 
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justification under international law.151  More specifically, states may 
justify abrogating a treaty by any one of three reasons:  (1) a breach 
of the treaty; (2) a fundamental change in circumstances; or (3) a lack 
of capacity to treat.152 
First, a state may terminate a treaty when another party has 
breached its obligations under the agreement.153  Any breach would of 
course not be adequate, since customary international law as well as 
the modern Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
Article 60—which codifies this customary principle—holds that a 
nation cannot terminate a treaty unless another party has materially 
breached a provision essential to the purpose of the treaty.154  In other 
words, there can be no treaty termination for an accidental breach or 
a trivial violation.155  In this case, Texas never alleged that the 
Cherokees failed to live up to their responsibilities in the Treaty, and 
history also has failed to provide such evidence.156  As a result, this 
justification does not seem applicable. 
Second, a treaty may be terminated under the doctrine of 
fundamental change in circumstances, known under international law 
as “rebus sic stantibus.”157  The idea behind this right is that the 
conditions that led to the conclusion of a treaty have changed so 
fundamentally that it is appropriate for any party to unilaterally 
terminate the agreement.158  One such condition that would be 
considered a fundamental change in circumstances would be the 
outbreak of war.159  For example, the United States offered this 
justification for terminating an international agreement on shipping 
load restrictions during World War II.160 
 
 151. See generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 38 (2001) 
(discussing justifications for treaty abrogation). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.; VCLT, supra note 135, art. 60. 
 155. BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 38. 
 156. President Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar claimed the Cherokees were threatening to 
join forces with Mexico in an effort to overthrow the Republic of Texas government, and as a 
result, they would never be permitted to establish a permanent and sovereign jurisdiction within 
Texas.  HOIG, supra note 47, at 187.  However, these alleged events transpired after the Senate 
refused to ratify the Treaty.  Id. at 185.  What is more, Lamar had little evidence to prove his 
claim.  Id. at 186-87. 
 157. BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 38. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  The agreement that the U.S. Attorney General terminated was the 1930 
International Load Lines Convention.  Id. 
01__NELSON.DOC 3/9/2007  10:01 AM 
20 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:1 
In the modern context, Article 62 of the VCLT has sought to 
limit the use of rebus sic stantibus to a limited set of circumstances,161 
and it explicitly forbids exercising this right in the case of agreements 
that establish a boundary, or where the party invoking the right has 
contributed to the changed circumstances by its own violation.162  The 
VCLT does not address the issue of war, as the termination of a 
treaty by war has always been a matter resolved by customary 
international law.163  When applying this principle to Texas in the 
1830s, there does not appear to be any evidence that a fundamental 
change in circumstances occurred during the period from 1836 to 1837 
that would justify unilateral Treaty termination (aside from the fact 
that after winning the Battle of San Jacinto, Texas no longer needed 
the Cherokees’ neutrality).  Hence, this reason appears unpersuasive. 
Finally, there is one remaining justification that Texas could have 
proffered when it abrogated the Treaty:  that the Cherokees, the 
Republic of Texas, or both lacked the capacity to enter the 
agreement.  Unfortunately, there is no hard and fast rule for 
determining the competence of less than fully-sovereign states to 
engage in treaty-making.164  Rather, the outcome depends exclusively 
on the facts of the case in question.165  Notwithstanding the principle’s 
lack of clarity, the Cherokees probably had the capacity to treat with 
the Republic of Texas.  This argument is supported by ample 
historical fact:  during the nineteenth century and before, it was 
common practice to consider agreements between colonizing settlers 
and indigenous peoples, such as the American Indians in North 
America, as treaties, even though indigenous peoples do not 
necessarily constitute a “state” as the term is used in the modern 
context.166  Thus, one can readily make a prima facie case for the 
Cherokees’ capacity to treat. 
 
 161. See VCLT, supra note 135, art. 62. 
 162. Id. art. 62(2)(a). 
 163. BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 39. 
 164. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 595 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts 
eds., 9th ed. 1992) (1905). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. § 595 n.2.  In addition, many of these agreements are still accepted as treaties under 
domestic law, even though they may not have this standing in the international realm.  Id.  See 
also GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 92-94 (2000) (discussing how early colonial practice in 
Great Britain, New Zealand, and the United States adhered to the view that indigenous peoples 
had treaty-making capacity); Wiessner, supra note 147, at 591 (discussing commitments arising 
from Indian treaties as international obligations). 
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In the case of the less-than-fully-sovereign Republic of Texas, its 
capacity to treat is probably best understood by examining the criteria 
for statehood that were codified under the “1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States” (Montevideo), at 
least to the extent that the Montevideo codified pre-existing 
customary international law.167  Article 1 of the Montevideo provides 
that “states” should possess the following:  (a) a permanent 
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity 
to enter into relations with other states.168  After a cursory 
examination of these criteria, one can convincingly argue that the 
Republic of Texas met the requirements of a permanent population 
and a defined territory.  Moreover, Texas had a fully functioning, 
stable, and effective government169 beginning with the Consultation in 
November of 1835.170  Thus, the remaining question concerns the 
Republic of Texas’s capacity to enter into relations with extant states; 
this criterion requires that the government possess both requisite 
constitutional authority and accompanying “political, technical, and 
financial capabilities.”171  Although the Plan and Powers seems to 
have provided the provisional government with only limited ability to 
enter into international agreements, it did include a modicum of such 
 
 167. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 
Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo].  The Montevideo criteria support the 
declarative theory of statehood, which holds that a state’s existence depends solely upon 
meeting the objective factors established under international law.  See Kelly Malone, The Rights 
of Newly Emerging Democratic States Prior to International Recognition and the Serbo-Croation 
Conflict, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 81, 91-93 (1992).  The recognition of an emerging entity—
like the Republic of Texas—by an established state simply indicates that state’s willingness to 
treat the emerging entity as if it possesses international standing.  Id.  In other words, statehood 
arises independently of recognition by other states.  Id.  In contrast, the constitutive theory of 
statehood, which is the minority position, holds that it is the act of recognition by states—the 
constitutive act—that establishes legal statehood for an emerging entity.  Id. 
 168. Malone, supra note 167, at 91-93.  Note that in practice (meaning customary 
international law), the third and fourth characteristics—government and capacity to enter into 
relations with other states—are often combined into a single characteristic:  authority.  
Professor Joel H. Samuels, Lecture at the University of Michigan Law School (Jan. 13, 2002).  
Since the 1960s, the requirement of democracy has emerged as a fifth characteristic under 
customary international law.  Malone, supra note 167, at 86-87. 
 169. See generally Malone, supra note 167 at 84-85 (discussing the requirement of a stable 
and effective government for statehood under international law). 
 170. See supra Part I.  The historian Emmet Starr explained that the Republic of Texas 
inaugurated an independent government with the Consultation, while the Cherokees remained 
a separate and quasi-independent nation, and were treated as such by Texas.  STARR, supra 
note 18, at 224. 
 171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 201 cmt. e (1987). 
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power and capability,172 and specifically enumerated the government’s 
duty to treat with the Indians.173  As such, this criterion appears to be 
satisfied.  Nevertheless, some commentators might assert that the 
provisional government’s limited constitutional authority and 
technical and financial constraints during this period cast doubt upon 
it having met the last statehood trait.  Accordingly, it is critical to note 
that there is some flexibility in meeting the statehood requirements 
under international law—the criteria are not absolute.174  This point 
explains not only why the Montevideo’s language holds that states 
“should” possess the aforesaid characteristics,175 but also why an 
agreement executed between an emerging state and a sovereign state 
has been held as a valid international agreement from the date of the 
emerging state’s independence.176  Therefore, both the Cherokees and 
the Republic of Texas seem to have had the capacity to treat. 
In summary, based on the analysis in this Article, the Treaty 
appears to be valid under both domestic and international law.  It was 
properly entered into by the Republic of Texas provisional 
government under the Plan and Powers, and aside from providing a 
ceremonial and legitimacy-enhancing aspect to the process, 
ratification by the Texas Senate was neither intended nor required.  
Moreover, pursuant to the well known principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, Texas was required to fulfill its obligations to the 
Cherokees under the agreement.  Finally, there does not appear to 
 
 172. See Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III (“[T]hey shall pass no laws except such as, 
in their opinion, the emergency of the country requires . . . they shall pursue the most effective 
and energetic measures to rid the country of her enemies, and place her in the best possible 
state of defence . . . .”). 
 173. Id. (“They shall have power, and it is hereby made the duty of the Governor and 
Council, to treat with the several tribes of Indians.”). 
 174. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (3d ed. 1979). 
 175. See Montevideo, supra note 167, art. 1.  See also BROWNLIE, supra note 174, at 74 
(explaining that Albania was recognized as a state even though its frontiers had yet to be firmly 
established). 
 176. See State v. Eliasov 1967 (4) SA 583 (A) (S. Afr.).  In this case, shortly before the 
dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963, one of the entities that was 
about to emerge—Southern Rhodesia—executed an agreement with South Africa that was held 
to be a valid international agreement from the date of the Federation’s dissolution.  Id.  This 
case reflects the modern view that emerging states are considered successor states and therefore 
are “equal heirs to the rights and obligations of the predecessor state.”  See Paul Williams & 
Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets: The Modern Law and Policy, 42 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 355, 362 (2001).  See also WATSON, supra note 166, at 97 (discussing binding 
international agreements between the United States and the emerging states of Micronesia and 
Palau).  See generally id. at 95-99 (discussing numerous cases where state actors—including 
Britain, Portugal, France, and the Arab States—have entered agreements with non-state actors 
such as liberation movements). 
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have been any justification for treaty abrogation:  there is no evidence 
of the occurrence of a material breach or fundamental change in 
circumstances, and both parties possessed the capacity to treat.  As a 
result, in all likelihood, the Treaty remains a valid instrument. 
III.  STATE SUCCESSION 
Because the Treaty between the Republic of Texas and the 
Cherokees is probably valid under both domestic and international 
law, especially when one considers that it appears to meet the rigors 
of contemporary international legal doctrine, the remaining question 
is whether the United States should have succeeded to the Treaty 
when it annexed Texas in 1845.  Admittedly, this question is not one 
of first impression in the legal community.  In fact, the Texas 
Cherokees have pursued an action for the Treaty’s breach on three 
prior occasions.177  Thus, before addressing the international law of 
state succession, these prior cases will be briefly considered.  The first 
two actions that the Cherokees pursued can be quickly summarized, 
while the third action, which involved an administrative tribunal, 
requires more extensive treatment. 
A. Prior Lawsuits by the Texas Cherokees 
In the Cherokees’ first action, approximately nine hundred heirs 
hired legal counsel to represent them in a $100 million suit against the 
state of Texas in 1915, where they requested compensation for the 
territory lost as a result of the Republic of Texas’s breach of the 
Treaty.178  Counsel petitioned the Supreme Court in 1920 for 
permission to sue, but the Court denied the request based upon 
authority in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.179  In that case, the Supreme 
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim because the 
Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state within the meaning of the 
U.S. Constitution.180  Nevertheless, the Cherokees did not abandon 
their quest for restitution.  In a second case, which occurred in 1924, 
the Tribe’s counsel enlisted the help of the Commissioner for Indian 
 
 177. In March 1964, Earl Boyd Pierce, General Counsel for the Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma, presented a plan to the Texas Government to settle the Texas Cherokees’ claim; the 
proposal was rejected.  CLARKE, supra note 12, at 122-25.  Because the plan was offered by the 
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, and not the Texas Cherokees, it is not considered here.  Id. 
 178. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 120. 
 179. Texas-Cherokees v. Texas, 257 U.S. 615 (1921) (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. 1 (1831)). 
 180. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20. 
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Affairs to pursue the claim.181  Unfortunately, this effort also failed to 
make any progress.182 
The Cherokees filed their third action alleging breach of the 
Treaty in 1948, but this time the claim was against the U.S. 
government for $5 million in compensation.183  The Cherokees had 
finally found an audience for their claim, but it was not a traditional 
court of law; rather, the Cherokees appeared before a now defunct 
administrative tribunal known as the Indian Claims Commission 
(ICC), which was created by Congress in 1946 to address grievances 
between Indian Tribes and the United States.184  Unfortunately for the 
Cherokees, the ICC poorly adjudicated their claim.185 
There are no bright spots in the ICC opinion for the Cherokees, 
as the court quashed all the claims that the Tribe promulgated.  From 
the outset, the ICC unequivocally disapproved of the Cherokees’ 
claim, stating their opinion by hastily narrating the Texas Cherokees’ 
history,186 and citing Western Cherokee v. United States, which held 
that an organization of Indians created to pursue a claim is not a 
“tribal organization” in the sense of the term that would permit 
Indians to pursue claims under the Indian Claims Commission Act.187  
More importantly, the ICC seemed to unduly emphasize the point 
that the Cherokees that had relocated to “parent tribes” in Oklahoma 
never attempted to return to Texas or to reclaim their distinct status 
 
 181. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 120. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Texas-Cherokees v. United States, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n 522 (1953). 
 184. The Indian Claims Commission (ICC) was an administrative tribunal created in 1946, 
and abolished in 1978.  Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (omitted 
from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30, 1978).  For further reading on 
the ICC, see generally H.D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN 
CLAIMS COMMISSION (1990). 
 185. See infra (discussing the ICC opinion); see also generally Richard J. Ansson, Jr., The 
Indian Claims Commission: Did the American Indians Really Have Their Day in Court?, 23 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 207 (1998) (discussing various problems with the ICC, including evidentiary and 
jurisprudential issues with claims, commissioner ignorance of Indian culture, lawyers who 
poorly represented tribes, and the tenacity with which the Department of Justice litigated 
against the Indians); Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Court of the Conqueror, 41 AM. 
U. L. REV. 753, 771-73 (1992) (exploring the ICC and reasons for its adoption of the adversary 
model); JOHN R. WUNDER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 111-15 (1994) (discussing the 
establishment and operation of the Indian Claims Commission, including key points such as: 
how Indians were not treated equally because they had to obtain permission to hire their 
lawyers; how the Department of Justice acted reprehensibly, employing outrageous litigation 
tactics; and how the ICC ultimately represented a miserable failure for American Indians). 
 186. See Texas-Cherokees, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n at 523-27. 
 187. Id. at 529 (citing Western Cherokee v. United States, 1 Indian Cl. Comm’n 165 (1949)). 
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as a separate tribe.188  This logic was patently flawed because the ICC 
ignored three key issues:  (1) there were Cherokees massacred in 
Texas;189 (2) there were Cherokees who did not join other tribes;190 
and (3) there were likely Cherokees spurned to regroup as a separate 
tribe, but who lacked the financial resources to pursue the 
endeavor.191 
To make their case, the Cherokees averred that the United 
States was under an obligation to help them pursue a claim for 
payment from the state of Texas for violation of the Treaty,192 and 
also that the United States was bound to deal honestly and fairly with 
the Indians because of the general fiduciary relationship existing 
between the Indians and the U.S. government.193  The ICC readily 
dismissed these claims.  First, the ICC stated that according to the 
holding in League v. De Young, it was strictly the province of the state 
of Texas alone to decide whether it would honor debts from the 
former Republic of Texas.194  Second, in addressing the fiduciary 
 
 188. See id. at 528-29. 
 189. See supra Part I (discussing the Cherokee War).  See also generally Indian Relations, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/ 
II/bzi1.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006) (“Mirabeau B. Lamar, who followed Houston as 
president, had neither experience with nor sympathy for the Indians; he wanted to destroy them 
or drive them from Texas.”); MARK M. CARROLL, HOMESTEADS UNGOVERNABLE: FAMILIES, 
SEX, RACE, AND THE LAW IN FRONTIER TEXAS, 1823-1860, 33 (2001) (explaining that President 
Lamar’s policy of Indian removal was based on the belief that Indians were “irredeemably 
primitive and unassimilable”); CLARKE, supra note 12, at 76 (discussing how President Lamar’s 
cabinet boasted they would “kill off Houston’s pet Indians”); EVERETT, supra note 17, at 100 
(describing President Lamar as “an inveterate enemy of the Cherokees”); DOUGLAS V. MEED, 
COMANCHE 1800-1874 (2003) (describing how President Lamar favored a policy of Indian 
extermination). 
 190. See EVERETT, supra note 17, at 108-14; Hicks, supra note 11. 
 191. See generally Alan L. Sorkin, The Economic Basis of Indian Life, 436 ANNALS OF THE 
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (1978); ALAN L. SORKIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND 
FEDERAL AID (1971).  See also generally Native Americans Still Poorest in the United States, 
INDIANZ.COM, Aug. 30, 2006, http://indianz.com/News/2006/015687.asp (discussing 2005 U.S. 
Census Bureau data on American Indian poverty). 
 192. Texas-Cherokees, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n at 534. 
 193. Id. at 532. 
 194. Id. at 534 (citing League v. De Young, 52 U.S. 185 (1850)).  What may be of interest to 
the reader is that Texas appeared to follow League in 1964 when Attorney General Waggoner 
Carr issued an opinion to Governor John Connally regarding a newly proposed settlement of 
the Cherokees’ claim.  See CLARKE, supra note 17, at 123-25.  In short, Carr concluded that the 
Cherokees’ claim was against the former Republic of Texas, and based on his analysis, the state 
of Texas did not intend to honor any such claims that had not been established by 1876.  Id.  
What also may be of interest, regarding the ICC opinion, is the ICC’s odd attempt to draw an 
analogy between the Cherokee case and Wichita Indians  v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 378 (1927).  
Texas-Cherokees, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n at 530-31.  In that case, the Wichita Indians were suing 
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relationship that the United States owed the Indians, the ICC stated:  
“[I]t will be remembered that the plaintiffs voluntarily left this 
country and became inhabitants of a foreign state . . . thus severing 
their right to the protection of this government.”195  Both of these 
rulings were incorrect. 
First, the ICC misinterpreted the League v. De Young opinion in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court was unconcerned with treaty law, state 
succession, or indigenous peoples, but was instead focused on the 
right of the former Republic of Texas to repudiate forged and 
fraudulent land titles.196  In this case, the Court held that the State of 
Texas alone had the authority to decide whether it would 
acknowledge land titles held by its citizens.197  Hence, League was 
inapplicable to the Cherokees’ claim.  Second, the ICC’s assertion 
that the Cherokees voluntarily left U.S. territory, and thereby 
forfeited fiduciary protection owed to them by the United States, is 
terribly misguided because the colonists encroached and forced the 
Tribe to leave the United States.198  More particularly, the Cherokees 
moved to preserve some semblance of their traditional way of life, 
and not because of any prior or burgeoning allegiance to a foreign 
state.199  Furthermore, the Cherokees were subsequently driven by 
force out of this “foreign” country—the Republic of Texas200—which 
shortly thereafter became a U.S. state.201  Thus, the ICC’s argument 
cannot stand because it ignores critical facts surrounding the 
Cherokees’ resettlement. 
 
for the value of 5,200,000 acres of land that they lost as a result of the United States relocating 
the Tribe from the state of Texas to a reservation.  Id.  It is unclear how a case of U.S. Indian 
removal from a state to a reservation is related to a case involving treaty abrogation and state 
succession under international law. 
 195. Texas-Cherokees, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n at 533. 
 196. 52 U.S. at 202-03. 
 197. Id. at 203. 
 198. See, e.g., THE REMOVAL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION: MANIFEST DESTINY OR 
NATIONAL DISHONOR 2 (Louis Filler & Allen Guttman eds., 1962)  (“Those of its members 
who preferred the life of hunters moved away to the Far West, while the bulk of the [Cherokee] 
tribe remaining settled down to the pursuit of agriculture.”); HOIG, supra note 47, at 113 
(“[S]ome of the Western Cherokees were already considering moving farther away from the 
mountains or to Mexico’s province of Texas to escape once again from the advancing tide of 
white intruders.”).  See also WILSON LUMPKIN, THE REMOVAL OF THE CHEROKEE INDIANS 
FROM GEORGIA (Arno Press 1969) (1907); ROBERTSON, supra note 1. 
 199. See generally HOIG, supra note 47, at 101-13. 
 200. See id., at 186-87.  Accord CLARKE, supra note 12, at 98-101; EVERETT, supra note 17, 
at 104-08. 
 201. See generally TEX. CONST. OF 1845, supra note 117. 
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To recapitulate, the Cherokees’ first two actions for breach of 
the Treaty failed because the Tribe found no audience, while the third 
action was poorly adjudicated by the ICC.  In particular, the ICC 
misinterpreted and misapplied case precedent, and chose to ignore 
key historical facts required to properly adjudicate the claim.  
Additionally, the ICC should have considered the international law of 
state succession as persuasive authority, as the next section of this 
Article will demonstrate.  As a result, the Cherokees have yet to 
receive a fair and balanced hearing on their claim. 
B. The Law of State Succession 
While state succession is an amorphous term, it can be defined as 
occurring when a former state becomes extinct, in whole or in part, 
and a new state replaces it.202  More specifically, state succession 
comes about when there has been a fundamental transformation in 
the state itself; it does not result from a mere change in government.203  
A change in the identity of a state can happen for a variety of reasons, 
including annexation, territorial cession, merger, decolonization, or 
dissolution.204  Whatever the cause, an identity change is a critical 
component of a state succession, as it determines whether the 
successor state begins life anew—“tabula rasa”—meaning the 
successor state succeeds to no rights or obligations of the predecessor 
state, or in the alternative, the successor state is responsible for all the 
prior obligations and liabilities of the predecessor state.205  As such, 
the only proper legal generalization that can be made about a state 
succession is that the nature of the change in a state’s identity and the 
type of issue involved will determine the legal consequences.206 
In the case at hand, the Republic of Texas ceased to exist when it 
was annexed by the United States in 1845:  the annexation produced a 
fundamental change in the state’s identity.207  Thus, because this 
Article previously concluded that the Treaty was in all likelihood a 
 
 202. Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Matthew James Kemner, The Enduring Political Nature 
of Questions of State Succession and Secession and the Quest for Objective Standards, 17 U. PA. 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 753, 756 (1996). 
 203. Michael John Volkovitsch, Note, Righting Wrongs: Towards a New Theory of State 
Succession to Responsibility for International Delicts, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2164 (1992). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Ebenroth & Kemner, supra note 202, at 783. 
 206. BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 58. 
 207. See Volkovitsch, supra note 203, at 1264 (noting annexation as one event that changes a 
state’s identity). 
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binding agreement between the Republic of Texas and the 
Cherokees, the remaining question is whether the United States 
should have succeeded to the obligation of the predecessor state.  The 
ICC held that the United States did not have to assume the obligation 
in its 1953 decision.  However, the ICC opinion failed to address the 
international law of state succession.208  Three legal principles merit 
consideration before one can fully understand the implications of the 
ICC’s mistake:  (1) the international law on state succession; (2) the 
behavior of the United States during colonization, prior annexation 
cases, and the post-Civil War period; and (3) the policy views on state 
succession promulgated by the United States in the global 
community. 
1. The International Law of State Succession.  When the United 
States annexed the Republic of Texas, Texas was merged into the 
United States.  At that precise moment of annexation, the Republic 
of Texas ceased to be a distinct nation, and instead became part of a 
larger state.209 
In order to better understand the rights and responsibilities of 
the United States after this annexation, one would expect to apply the 
contemporary codification of international principles of state 
succession:  the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect 
of Treaties (VCSST).210  However, the United States has chosen not to 
subscribe to the VCSST, instead choosing to follow the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law (Restatement), which more closely 
reflects the views promulgated in the VCLT.211  Thus, the 
Restatement is the more appropriate doctrine to apply.  The 
pertinent section in the Restatement reads: 
Subject to agreement between predecessor and successor states, 
responsibility for the public debt of the predecessor, and rights and 
obligations under its contracts, remain with the predecessor state, 
except . . . (b) where a state is absorbed by another state, the public 
 
 208. See Texas-Cherokess v. United States, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n 522, 522-35 (1953) (The 
opinion of the Commission contains no discussion of state succession doctrine.). 
 209. See Volkovitsch, supra note 203, at 1264 (noting annexation as one event that changes a 
state’s identity). 
 210. For a critique of the failings of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties in comporting with actual state practice, see Sari T. Korman, Note, The 
1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: An Inadequate Response 
to the Issue of State Succession, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 174 (1992). 
 211. Ebenroth & Kemner, supra note 202, at 783. 
01__NELSON.DOC 3/9/2007  10:01 AM 
2006] THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 29 
debt, and rights and obligations under contracts of the absorbed 
state, pass to the absorbing state.”212 
The Republic of Texas was the “absorbed state,” and land that Texas 
promised the Cherokees is akin to a “former debt” of the predecessor 
state.  As such, if the United States were allowed to nullify the debt 
owed to the Cherokees, the United States would be unlawfully 
enriched by obtaining land already ceded to another entity.  This 
conclusion also jibes with the more contemporary VCSST:  under 
Article 11, a state succession does not affect a boundary established 
by a treaty, and Article 12 ensures that a state succession does not 
affect obligations relating to the use of any territory for the benefit of 
a foreign state (where “state” implies the Texas Cherokees).213  Thus, 
the international law of state succession probably answers that the 
United States should have succeeded to the Treaty. 
2. Behavior of the United States—Colonization, Prior 
Annexation Cases, and Post-Civil War.  The historical behavior of the 
United States during colonization, prior annexation cases, and the 
post-Civil War era contradicts its decision not to assume the Treaty.  
First, consider the behavior of the United States during the colonial 
period, which was consistent with state succession principles.  
Presently, the United States remains subject to agreements between 
 
 212. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 209 (1987).  Section 209 states: 
(1) Subject to agreement between predecessor and successor states, title to state 
property passes as follows: 
(a) where part of the territory of a state becomes territory of another state, 
property of the predecessor state located in that territory passes to the successor 
state; 
(b) where a state is absorbed by another state, property of the absorbed state, 
wherever located, passes to the absorbing state; 
(c) where part of a state becomes a separate state, property of the predecessor 
state located in the territory of the new state passes to the new state. 
(2) Subject to agreement between predecessor and successor states, responsibility for 
the public debt of the predecessor, and rights and obligations under its contracts, 
remain with the predecessor state, except as follows: 
(a) where part of the territory of a state becomes territory of another state, local 
public debt, and the rights and obligations of the predecessor state under contracts 
relating to that territory, are transferred to the successor state; 
(b) where a state is absorbed by another state, the public debt, and rights and 
obligations under contracts of the absorbed state, pass to the absorbing state; 
(c) where part of a state becomes a separate state, local public debt, and rights and 
obligations of the predecessor state under contracts relating to the territory of the 
new state, pass to the new state. 
Id. 
 213. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties arts. 11-12, Aug. 23, 
1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter VCSST]. 
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Indian tribes and states that predate the states’ admittance into the 
union.  For example, two such tribes are the Pamunkey Tribe and the 
Mattaponi Tribe, both of which treated with Virginia on May 29, 
1677.214  These two tribes are currently recognized by the state of 
Virginia, and also maintain land holdings in the state.215  As Professor 
Victoria Sutton aptly noted, such pre-Constitutional treaties were 
accepted by the United States with successor-in-interest logic:  the 
United States was the successor to the obligations of the former 
colonies.216 
Second, the United States chose to recognize property claims in 
prior historical annexation cases.  For instance, the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo (the Hidalgo Treaty), which was signed in 1848, 
put an end to the Mexican War.217  Under the Hidalgo Treaty, Mexico 
ceded the upper portion of California, New Mexico, and Arizona to 
the United States, and recognized American claims over Texas, with 
the Rio Grande demarcating its southern boundary.218  The United 
States paid Mexico $15 million for the land, assumed the claims of 
American citizens against Mexico, recognized prior southwest land 
grants, and offered citizenship to Mexicans that were residing in the 
ceded territories.219  Although this territorial acquisition differs 
somewhat from the Republic of Texas case, the salient point is that 
Article VIII of the Hidalgo Treaty specified that property owned by 
Mexicans in the ceded territories would be inviolably respected, 
regardless of whether the owners were absentee owners or ever 
physically present in such territories.220  In brief, the case illustrates 
 
 214. The Treaty Between Virginia and the Indians, May 29, 1677, Colony of Va.-Indians, 
reprinted in EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES & LAWS, 1697-1789, VIRGINIA 
& MARYLAND LAWS 83 (Alden T. Vaughan & Deborah A. Rosen eds., 1998), available at 
http://www.baylink.org/treaty/. 
 215. See Virginia Council on Indians: Virginia Tribes, http://indians.vipnet.org/tribes/ 
index.cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
 216. Sutton, supra note 119, at 545. 
 217. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlements, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 
922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo]. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. art. VIII.  The text of Article VIII states: 
Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico, and which 
remain for the future within the limits of the United States, as defined by the present 
treaty, shall be free to continue where they now reside, or to remove at any time to the 
Mexican Republic, retaining the property which they possess in the said territories, or 
disposing thereof, and removing the proceeds wherever they please, without their 
being subjected, on this account, to any contribution, tax, or charge whatever. 
Those who shall prefer to remain in the said territories, may either retain the title and 
rights of Mexican citizens, or acquire those of citizens of the United States.  But they 
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that “the transfer of sovereignty via state succession [had] no effect 
on private property rights.”221  This legal principle had already been 
settled under U.S. law in the earlier case of United States v. 
Percheman, where the Supreme Court held that the cession of 
territory from one sovereign to another does not interfere with 
private property rights.222  Furthermore, in the later case of Barker v. 
Harvey, the Supreme Court held that mission Indians were allowed to 
make private property claims following the Mexican War, even 
though the claim in that case failed because the Indians did not 
comply with a statute requiring the claim to have been submitted 
within a two-year statute of limitations period.223 
Third, the United States again adhered to state succession 
principles at the end of the Civil War.224  The basic question that 
surfaced during this period was whether Confederate property 
“passed to the United States upon the demise of the Confederacy.”225  
Following the state succession model presented by international law, 
Confederate property did pass to the United States at the end of the 
Civil War.226  This conclusion was also supported by the Supreme 
Court in cases immediately after the Civil War, where the court 
concluded that as a matter of law, “the U.S. was entitled to all the 
property and rights of the conquered confederate government.”227  
 
shall be under the obligation to make their election within one year from the date of 
the exchange of ratifications of this treaty; and those who shall remain in the said 
territories after the expiration of that year, without having declared their intention to 
retain the character of Mexicans, shall be considered to have elected to become 
citizens of the United States. 
In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to Mexicans not 
established there, shall be inviolably respected.  The present owners, the heirs of these, 
and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said property by contract, shall enjoy with 
respect to it guaranties equally ample as if the same belonged to citizens of the United 
States. 
Id. 
 221. Ebenroth & Kemner, supra note 202, at 777. 
 222. 32 U.S. 51, 87 (1833).  See also Townsend v. Greeley, 72 U.S. 326, 337 (1866) (holding 
that municipal land held by the city of San Francisco as successor to the former pueblo 
(meaning town) existing there was not held in absolute property; this land was held in trust for 
the city’s inhabitants as it had been held under the laws of Mexico prior to cession under the 
Hidalgo Treaty). 
 223. 181 U.S. 481, 490 (1901). 
 224. For further reading on the United States Civil War, see LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CIVIL 
WAR DESK REFERENCE (Margaret E. Wagner et al. eds., 2002). 
 225. William J. Pallas, The Doctrine of State Succession and the Law of Historic Shipwrecks, 
The Bell of Alabama: United States v. Steinmetz, 17 TUL. MAR. L.J. 343, 344 (1993). 
 226. Id. at 344-45. 
 227. Id. at 345 (citing  United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. 414 (1873); Titus v. United States, 
87 U.S. 475 (1874); Whitfield v. United States, 92 U.S. 165 (1875)). 
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These principles were summarized by Justice Clifford in United States 
v. Huckabee: 
Complete conquest . . . carries with it all the rights of . . . the 
conqueror, [and] by the completion of his conquest, becomes 
the absolute owner of the property conquered from the 
enemy, nation, or state.  His rights are no longer limited to 
mere occupation of what he has taken into his actual 
possession, but they extend to all the property and rights of 
the conquered state, including even debts as well as personal 
and real property.228 
Hence, the Supreme Court held in Huckabee that the liabilities of the 
conquered become the liabilities of the conqueror.229  This outcome is 
compelling because in the case of the Confederacy, the United States 
absorbed a group of states that had seceded of their own volition; it 
appears that in this scenario the United States had justifiable grounds 
for refusing to honor the liabilities of the rogue government.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court unequivocally proclaimed that 
assets and liabilities accrued to the absorbing state. 
In sum, the United States has historically behaved consistently 
with state succession principles.  To begin, the United States applied 
successor-in-interest logic to assume Indian treaties from the colonies.  
Next, the United States recognized the inviolable nature of private 
property in prior annexation cases such as the Hidalgo Treaty.  
Finally, the United States followed the state succession model post-
Civil War, and even incorporated this logic into Supreme Court 
precedent.  Thus, this behavior implies that the United States should 
have succeeded to the Treaty. 
3. Historical Views Proclaimed by the United States.  The 
United States’ failure to assume the Treaty contradicts its behavior 
just over a decade before the ICC decided the Cherokees’ claim.  
More particularly, the United States was quite vocal about other 
states being obliged to follow state succession principles.  For 
instance, when Germany absorbed Austria through the Anschluss of 
1938, the United States argued that Germany should assume the 
debts of Austria.230  Not to be deterred, Germany retorted that the 
 
 228. 83 U.S. at 434-35 (emphasis added). 
 229. See id. 
 230. See Detlev F. Vagts, State Succession: The Codifiers’ View, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 285 
(1993) (citing James Wilford Garner, Questions of State Succession Raised by the German 
Annexation of Austria, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 421 (1938)).  See also M.H. Hoeflich, Through a Glass 
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United States had failed to follow its own prescription when it 
annexed the Republic of Texas.231  This dispute was not resolved until 
after World War II, and then it was decided in favor of the U.S. 
position:  Germany agreed to assume Austria’s liabilities.232  The key 
point to glean from this example is that the United States was keenly 
aware of the international law on state succession.  As such, the 
United States should have followed state succession principles and 
succeeded to the Treaty. 
To sum up, this section addressed the following issue:  whether 
the United States should have succeeded to the Treaty after it 
annexed the Republic of Texas, given that this agreement was in all 
likelihood a valid obligation of the predecessor state.  The ICC held 
that the United States was not responsible for the obligation in 1953, 
but in reaching its dubious holding, the tribunal failed to consider the 
international law on state succession.  As such, an exploration of this 
issue produces three conclusions.  First, the United States failed to 
adhere to state succession principles as codified in the contemporary 
Restatement and VCSST.  Second, the United States ignored its own 
behavior during the colonization period, prior annexation cases, and 
the post-Civil War era.  Third, the United States contradicted its own 
policy views as promulgated in the global community.  The 
culmination of this evidence presents a cogent case for the 
proposition that the United States should have succeeded to the 
Treaty. 
IV.  ADVERSE POSSESSION—AN ALTERNATE CLAIM TO 
RIGHT BY TREATY 
When President Sam Houston wrote to then Attorney General 
G. W. Terrell for an opinion on the Cherokee matter in 1842, Terrell 
raised another legal issue that merits discussion.  He opined that the 
Cherokees’ claim was legally valid because “by settling and 
continuously occupying their lands, the Cherokee had acquired an 
inchoate right to them, which should have matured into a perfect 
 
Darkly: Reflections upon the History of the International Law of Public Debt in Connection with 
State Succession, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 39, 63-65 (1982). 
 231. See Detlev F. Vagts, International Law in the Third Reich, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 661, 690 
(1990) (citing Garner, supra note 230). 
 232. Timothy W. Guinnane, Financial Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung: The 1953 London Debt 
Agreement 21-22 (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 880, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=493802. 
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title.”233  Terrell correctly asserted that title to land could be perfected 
through settlement and continuous occupation.  The Cherokees 
probably had a valid legal claim to the land under the doctrine of 
adverse possession, which is a method of acquiring title to property by 
possession for a statutory period.234 
Adverse possession is a doctrine recognized in the civil codes and 
legal traditions of many countries.235  Though adverse possession does 
further utilitarian ends by quieting land titles,236 Oliver Wendell 
Holmes succinctly stated another key underpinning of the doctrine in 
terms of personhood:  “the foundation of the acquisition of rights by 
lapse of time is to be looked for in the position of the person who 
gains them, not in that of the loser.”237  Because the Cherokees 
immigrated to Texas, constituting their lives and beings in land that 
they occupied for nearly twenty years, a claim of title by adverse 
possession would have plainly satisfied personhood concerns.  
Moreover, the doctrine would have also served a utilitarian purpose 
by quieting title to property that the Cherokees claimed while living 
under the sovereign jurisdiction of both Mexico and the Republic of 
Texas.  As a result, there is no viable reason why the Cherokees could 
not have proffered an adverse possession claim to the disputed 
territory as an alternative to a claim under the Treaty.238 
 
 233. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 79. 
 234. For the general elements of adverse possession, see 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession  
§ 10 (2006) [hereinafter AMJUR].  For further reading on adverse possession, see Thomas W. 
Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122 (1985); 
William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Comment, Outlaws of the Past: A Western 
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79 (1996); 
Henry W. Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28 YALE L. J. 219 (1918); Henry W. 
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918). 
 235. Winter King, Illegal Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs, 44 HARV. INT’L L. 
J. 433, 452 (2003). 
 236. Edward G. Mascolo, A Primer on Adverse Possession, 66 CONN. B. J. 303, 303 (1992). 
 237. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897). 
 238. Patently, this exercise is academic in nature because the hostile nature of the Texas 
courts toward Indians during this period raises doubts as to whether the Cherokees would have 
met with any success in pursuing an adverse possession claim, even if such claim had merit.  See, 
e.g., TEX. CONST., supra note 94, gen. provisions § 10 (denying Indians citizenship); Herndon v. 
Casiano, 7 Tex. 322, 335 (1851) (“[T]hey were driven out of their homes and ancient possessions 
by the incursions of hostile savages.”); Horton v. Crawford, 10 Tex. 382, 389 (1853) 
(“[E]xtensive portions of our frontiers were also infested by the incursions of ferocious and 
hostile savages.”); Kilpatrick v. Sisneros, 23 Tex. 113, 113 (1859) (discussing how Africans, 
African descendants, and Indians were not citizens of Texas).  Notwithstanding, the Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Texas recognized in dicta that the Cherokees may have acquired title 
to lands in Texas pursuant to their settlement while under Mexican rule.  See Herbert v. Moore, 
Dallam 592, 594 (Tex. 1844) (“With one exception, assumed by some to have been made in 
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In early Texas history, there were five basic elements to an 
adverse possession claim,239 and these requirements remain generally 
unchanged today.240  First, there must have been “actual” 
occupation,241 which is equivalent to the modern understanding of 
entry and exclusive use.  Entry and exclusive use of the property is a 
central construct because it differentiates between simply seeing 
 
favor of the Cherokees and their associates by the Mexican government, we know of no lands to 
which the Indians ever set up an absolute, indefeasible title within the limits of the 
republic . . . .”).  Hence, although it would have been difficult to proffer, the claim did have 
merit.  The purpose of briefly exploring the topic in this article is to show that the Republic of 
Texas likely acted in bad faith by refusing to abide by the Treaty (meaning Texas was acutely 
aware that the Cherokees had probably acquired an alternative right to the disputed territory 
via adverse possession).  Without question, a rigorous analysis of the adverse possession claim 
given the complex issues accompanying this historical period is beyond the scope of this Article 
(for example, the potential conflict among Spanish, Mexican, and Texan laws, the likely title 
disputes among land speculators, settlers, and the Cherokees regarding the territory, and so on). 
 239. Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166, 171 (1884).  In the preface to the list of adverse 
possession elements, Associate Justice West stated:  “It is well settled that, where a party relies 
upon naked possession alone as the foundation for his adverse claim, it must be such an actual 
occupancy that the law recognizes as sufficient, if persisted in for a long enough period of time, 
to cut off the true owner’s right of recovery.”  Id.  While this case was decided several decades 
after the Texas revolution, the elements enumerated in Satterwhite were discussed in earlier 
Texas precedent, though not in well-articulated terms.  See Jones v. Borden, 5 Tex. 410, 414 
(1849) (“In support of possession, where this has been continued for the period prescribed by or 
analogous to the statutes of limitation, a grant, deed, or any other instrument effectual to 
convey title will be presumed.  But possession is the essential basis of such presumption.”); 
Lewis v. San Antonio, 7 Tex. 288, 305 (1851) (“If this enjoyment has been not only not 
interrupted, but exclusive and adverse in its character, for the period . . . this also has been held 
at common law as a conclusive presumption of title.”); Wheeler v. Moody, 9 Tex. 372, 372 
(1853) (“It must be, in the language of the authorities, an actual, continued, adverse, and 
exclusive possession for the space of time required by the statute.”); Charle v. Saffold, 13 Tex. 
94, 108 (1854) (“This possession was notoriously in their own right, adverse to the plaintiff and 
all others, and had, prior to the institution of suit, been continued for nearly sixteen years.”); 
Lambert v. Weir, 27 Tex. 359, 361 (1864) (“[T]hey claim and hold, had and held adverse, 
peaceable, continuous and uninterrupted possession for five years . . . under color of title . . . .”); 
Parker v. Baines, 65 Tex. 605, 609 (1886) (“It is necessary, to set the statute of limitations in 
motion, that the possession be actual, visible, notorious, distinct, and hostile.” (citation 
omitted)).  This Article avers that by analyzing the Cherokees’ claim under the more rigorous 
adverse possession elements as recited in Satterwhite, the result—a right to possession of the 
claimed lands—would be more cogent than analyzing the Cherokees’ claim under earlier cases 
where the elements of adverse possession were not well-articulated (meaning that if the 
Cherokees could have succeeded in proffering a claim under Satterwhite then, a fortiori, they 
could have succeeded in their claim during the period in question, ceteris paribus). 
 240. Texas continues to cite the elements of adverse possession as outlined in Satterwhite.  
E.g., Rhodes v. Cahill, 802 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. 1990) (citing Satterwhite, 61 Tex. at 171).  In 
the modern context, Texas defines adverse possession by statute as “an actual and visible 
appropriation of real property, commenced and continued under a claim of right that is 
inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of another person.”  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 16.021(1) (Vernon 2005). 
 241. Satterwhite, 61 Tex. at 171. 
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property and claiming it.242  In addition, this criterion provides a 
precise moment from which one can count the years specified in the 
statutory period required for an adverse possession claim, and also 
provides a way to limit the geographical scope of the territorial title.243  
In the case of the Cherokees, there is sufficient evidence to support 
the assertion that there was actual possession of the claimed land.  
The Cherokees began occupying the land shortly before negotiating a 
treaty with the Mexican government in 1922 to inhabit the territory,244 
and continued their occupation until being forcibly removed in 
1839.245  If there is any uncertainty in meeting this criterion, it would 
be regarding the amount of land the Cherokees actually possessed.  
But even this concern is negligible, because the Republic of Texas 
recognized the location of the Cherokees’ holding—as evidenced by 
the precise boundary demarcations identified in the Treaty.246  As 
such, the element appears to have been satisfied. 
The second adverse possession element is that the possession 
must have been visible and notorious.247  Visibility and notoriety are 
important because the true property owner must notice that the land 
is being adversely possessed to have the opportunity to evict or take 
other action against the adverse possessor.248  The Cherokees plainly 
satisfied these criteria, as both Mexico and the Republic of Texas 
were aware that the Cherokees occupied the territory and claimed 
that they owned the land.  This assertion is supported by the 
numerous attempted negotiations that the Cherokees had with the 
Mexican government in their attempt to obtain official title to the 
occupied lands,249 as well as by the Treaty with the Republic of 
Texas.250  Hence, the Cherokees satisfied the visibility and notoriety 
requirements. 
The third adverse possession element is that the occupation must 
have been hostile (meaning adverse, or without the legal right to 
 
 242. See Parker, 65 Tex. at 608-09. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 178 (The Cherokees occupied territory in Texas and went 
to San Antonio to meet with the provincial governor, where they entered into a treaty.). 
 245. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 110-11. 
 246. Treaty, supra note 90. 
 247. Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166, 171 (1884). 
 248. Parker, 65 Tex. at 606, 609–10. 
 249. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 183. 
 250. See Treaty, supra note 90. 
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possess the property),251 and “of such a character as to indicate 
unmistakably an assertion of a claim of exclusive ownership in the 
occupant.”252  It is unequivocal that the Cherokees entered the 
territory without the permission of Mexico in 1821, and that they 
intended to claim the land as their own.253  Granted, the Cherokees 
made repeated attempts to obtain legal title to the property from the 
Mexican government, but all such efforts failed.254  Even so, they 
never relinquished or subordinated their territorial claim.255  What is 
more, despite having executed the Treaty with the Republic of Texas 
in 1836, the Cherokees were acutely aware that their right to hold and 
occupy the land was in serious doubt.256  Notwithstanding, they 
steadfastly refused to surrender the territory; this defiance eventually 
lead to the Cherokee War (and their forced removal).257  Thus, there 
is significant evidence to show hostility, and the element was most 
likely satisfied. 
 
 251. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 
2426 (2001). 
 252. Satterwhite, 61 Tex. at 171 (citation omitted).  More often than not, the hostility 
element presents the greatest amount of difficulty for an adverse possession claim; it remains a 
hotly debated topic today.  See Stake, supra note 251, at 2426.  Nevertheless, our purpose is not 
to prove conclusively that the Cherokees acquired title to the land via adverse possession, but 
instead to show that the claim was feasible, which illustrates bad faith on the part of the 
Republic of Texas in abrogating the Treaty.  Recall as well that the former Republic of Texas 
Attorney General G.W. Terrell, a lawyer of this historical period, previously averred that the 
Cherokees had acquired an inchoate right to the land.  CLARKE, supra note 12, at 78-79. 
 253. See Chance v. Branch, 58 Tex. 490, 492-93 (1883) (The original entry must have been 
without the owner’s permission and with the intent to claim the property for an adverse 
possession to occur; one cannot enter or hold in subordination to the owner.). 
 254. See supra Part I. 
 255. Id.  See also CLARKE, supra note 12, at 78-79 (discussing how the Cherokees drove 
“intruders” off their land during Mexico’s rule). 
 256. See, e.g., CLARKE, supra note 12, at 70-71 (explaining that by 1837 the Indians were 
restless and distrustful of the white settlers, and that the Mexicans were attempting to woo the 
Indians into their favor; this prompted Houston to offer Chief Bowles a post in the Texas 
Army); id. at 73-74 (discussing how Houston attempted to lay out the boundary lines to the 
Cherokees’ territory in 1838, but this act created anger among land speculators, citizens, and 
soldiers with competing claims to the land; the Cherokees were aware that the whites contested 
to their territorial claim).  Note that even if one argues that the Cherokees held the land 
subordinate to the Republic of Texas after the Treaty was executed, by this point in time, the 
Cherokees had possessed the land for approximately fifteen years; this holding period was 
probably long enough to meet the statutory requirements.  See infra notes 258-63 and 
accompanying text. Notwithstanding, this counterargument is problematic because land 
speculators, settlers, and others were staking claims to the Cherokees’ land.  CLARKE, supra 
note 12, at 73-74. 
 257. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 73-74. 
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The fourth adverse possession element requires that the claimant 
occupy the property for a continuous statutory period.258  This 
element is important because the period of occupation fixed by law 
should be “continuously and consistently adverse.”259  The Supreme 
Court of Texas aptly characterized the policy behind this element 
when it stated:  “[A] party will not be allowed to blow hot and to blow 
cold, for such conduct is calculated to trick and deceive the true 
owner and lull him to sleep.”260  In the case of the Cherokees, at no 
time did they subordinate their title claim to other individuals, as they 
persistently occupied and claimed their lands for nearly two 
decades.261  Because no true owners exercised their right of entry 
within the ten year period specified by the statute of limitations, the 
owners’ right to enter the property was barred by law.262  Moreover, it 
remains critical to acknowledge that the Cherokees deserted their 
territory because they were removed by force—not because they 
voluntarily abandoned their claim.263  Hence, it seems that this 
element was met. 
 
 258. Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166, 171 (1884). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 172. 
 261. See supra Part I.  See also generally CLARKE, supra note 12, at 3 (explaining that the 
Cherokees “claimed a large area of East Texas” from 1819 to 1839), 79 (discussing the former 
Texas Attorney General G.W. Terrell’s opinion that “by settling and continuously occupying 
their lands, the Cherokees had acquired an inchoate right to them”). 
 262. See Charle v. Saffold, 13 Tex. 94, 111 (1854).  See also Portis v. Hill, 3 Tex. 273, 279-80 
(1848) (“Of the several pleas of limitation of the defendant, Samuel A. Cummings, the first 
appears to have been framed with especial reference to the 17th section of the act of limitations 
of 1841, alleging that the defendant had been in the ‘adverse, peaceable possession of the said 
land, using and enjoying the same,’ for a period of more than ten years.  No reason is perceived 
why this is not a good plea of the limitation prescribed by the 17th section of the statute.”).  See 
Redding v. Redding’s Ex’rs and Heirs, 15 Tex. 249, 251 (1855); Lambert v. Weir, 27 Tex. 359, 
363 (1864); McMasters v. Mills, 30 Tex. 591, 594-95 (1868).  For further evidence that a ten-year 
statute of limitations was in effect during the years after the Texas revolution—and prior to 
codification by statute—see Duncan v. Rawls, 16 Tex. 478, 482-85 (1856); Hall v. Phelps, Dallam 
435, 440 (Tex. 1841) (discussing the application of a ten-year statute of limitations to a suit 
involving land title). 
 263. This point is noteworthy not only because it shows the Cherokees did not voluntarily 
abandon a claim to title, but also because the Republic of Texas passed legislation in 1836 that 
declared a lawsuit was the only means to interrupt an adverse possessor’s peaceable possession.  
An Act, Organizaing the Inferior Courts, and Defining the Powers and Jurisdiction of the Same, 
§ 39 (1836) (Rep. of Tex.), reprinted in 1 GAMMEL’S THE LAW OF TEXAS, supra note 83 
[hereinafter Act of 1836].  As the Supreme Court of Texas stated:  “In the act of 20th 
December, 1836, it was said, that ‘a peaceable possession can only be interrupted by an actual 
suit being instituted, and prosecuted agreeably to the due forms of law. . . .’  We do not think the 
legislature intended to change this rule [by the act of 1841].”  Shields v. Boone, 22 Tex. 193, 198 
(1858).  As such, even if one argues that the English common law statute of limitations of 
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Finally, though not required,264 color of title would have assisted 
the Cherokee’s claim that they adversely possessed the disputed 
territory (including the extent of such possession).265  Color of title 
generally requires that the adverse possessor’s claim is founded upon 
a document that is defective in some respect.266  Here, of course, the 
Cherokees relied on the Treaty, which contained a conveyance of a 
demarcated territory.  So even though the Treaty was declared null, 
their continued occupation was based upon a document that the 
Cherokees believed was legally valid.  As such, color of title was 
likely established for at least a portion of the statutory period.267 
In summary, the Cherokees probably met the elements required 
to claim title to the disputed territory under the doctrine of adverse 
possession.  Furthermore, the Tribe invested its labor to improve the 
land, developed personhood connected to it, and presented the 
requisite utility in quieting land title that is critical to the policy 
underlying the adverse possession doctrine.  Although it seems highly 
improbable that the Cherokees could maintain an adverse possession 
claim today, the foregoing analysis offers evidence of bad faith on the 
Republic of Texas’s behalf in abrogating the Treaty.  Attorney 
General Terrell recognized that the Cherokees probably had an 
inchoate right to the occupied territory that had matured into perfect 
title,268 so it seems implausible that members of the Republic of Texas 
Senate were not also aware of the applicability of the adverse 
possession doctrine.269  Therefore, the Senate’s argument that the 
provisional government exceeded its powers by entering the Treaty, 
 
twenty years was applicable to an adverse possession claim, see, for example, Lewis v. San 
Antonio, 7 Tex. 288, 308 (1851), the Act of 1836 implies that forcibly removing the Cherokees 
did not stay the statute of limitations from running (as there was never a legal action filed 
against the Cherokees). 
 264. See Satterwhite, 61 Tex. at 171. 
 265. See Lambert, 27 Tex. at 365; Charle, 13 Tex. at 111-12.  This type of claim is known as 
constructive possession.  See AMJUR, supra note 234, § 124 (stating “[c]olor of title is required to 
extend an actual possession of a part of a tract of land constructively over the rest of it”). 
 266. AMJUR, supra note 234, § 123. 
 267. Although not explored here, a claim under color of title reduced the requisite statute of 
limitation period under Texas law.  Act of 1836, supra note 263, § 39 (The legislature passed a 
five year statute of limitations in cases of adverse possession where the property was held by a 
Republic of Texas citizen under color of title that was recorded in the proper county.). 
 268. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 79. 
 269. See generally Act of 1836, supra note 263, § 39 (The Republic of Texas Senate enacted 
statutory law governing adverse possession.).  See also generally supra note 239 (There were 
numerous adverse possession cases during this historical period.). 
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thereby injuring the citizenry and the country,270 appears spurious 
when one recognizes that the Cherokees were likely already entitled 
to the property under the doctrine of adverse possession. 
V.  TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
This Article previously averred that the ICC mistakenly held that 
the Cherokees forfeited the traditional fiduciary relationship existing 
between the United States and its indigenous peoples by emigrating 
to the Republic of Texas.271  However, rather than being a result of 
simple ignorance as to the facts surrounding the Cherokees’ decision 
to emigrate, the ICC’s argument resembles a mere pretext when one 
considers the plethora of cases in which the United States has not 
acted in a way that would even come close to fulfilling the 
requirements of a fiduciary relationship.272  Moreover, throughout the 
nation’s history, the United States has repeatedly stripped land away 
from Indians, and this reprehensible conduct should not be ignored.273 
The purported fiduciary role applicable to the Indians was 
spelled out early in U.S. history with the 1787 passage of the 
Northwest Ordinance:  “The utmost good faith shall always be 
observed towards the Indians; their lands shall never be taken from 
them without their consent . . . .”274  The fulfillment of this fiduciary 
role did not always fall upon deaf ears:  Justice Marshall echoed this 
sentiment in Worcester v. Georgia, where he explained that the 
Cherokee Nation was a sovereign entity, in which the laws of the state 
of Georgia had no force, as “[t]he whole intercourse between the 
 
 270. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 72. 
 271. Texas-Cherokee v. United States, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n 522, 533 (1953). 
 272. See Clinton, supra note 2, at 99.  See also Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of 
Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian 
Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 258-65 (discussing how the United States has a long and 
egregious history of violating treaties with American Indians).  For further reading on how the 
modern-day U.S. Supreme Court has stripped inherent powers away from tribes and transferred 
those powers to states, see Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s 
Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003). 
 273. See Clinton, supra note 2, at 82-85.  See also Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and 
Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 42-51 (1991) (exploring the implications of placing American 
Indian property rights on equal footing with non-Indian property rights); Rebecca Tsosie, Land, 
Culture and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property in America, 34 IND. L. 
REV. 1291, 1306-12 (2001) (proposing a framework on “intercultural justice” that incorporates 
indigenous people’s interests in sovereignty and property). 
 274. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of 
the River Ohio, 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 340-41 (1787), quoted in Wiessner, 
supra note 147, at 571. 
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United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested 
in the government of the United States.”275  The Supreme Court again 
reiterated the fiduciary role in Barker v. Harvey, when Justice Brewer 
stated:  “It is undoubtedly true that this government has always 
recognized the fact that the Indians were its wards, and entitled to be 
protected as such, and this court has uniformly construed all 
legislation in the light of this recognized obligation.”276  Given its well-
documented and long-standing fiduciary obligation, it is surprising 
that the U.S. government has frequently been unjust toward the 
Indians.277 
Of course, the United States is not alone in its mistreatment of 
indigenous peoples.  For instance, the abhorrent treatment of the 
Aboriginal people of Australia is infamous throughout the 
international community.  The British reduced Australia’s Aboriginal 
population to four percent of its former strength in one century,278 and 
like the United States, the Australian government now faces 
retribution as the Aborigines proffer land claims to vast areas of the 
continent.279  More proximate to the United States is Canada, where 
the government recently offered a formal apology to its indigenous 
peoples for years of neglect, including the widespread abuse of Indian 
children in the country’s federally-funded boarding schools.280  In 
Latin America—another region characterized by large Indian 
populations—similar cases of injustice abound.  For example, Brazil’s 
Karaja Indians made headlines in recent years after journalists 
discovered that local activists contract with the Karjas to capture fish, 
turtles, and animal skins in exchange for alcohol.281  Because a large 
percentage of the Karajas are addicted to alcohol, exchanging alcohol 
for these services puts these people in a position of slavery and 
 
 275. 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). 
 276. 181 U.S. 481, 492 (1901). 
 277. For a contemporary view of the atrocities committed against the American Indians, as 
well a newly proposed theory of justice that might serve to redress these wrongs, see William 
Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 
(2005). 
 278. See Ben Kiernan, Cover-Up and Denial of Genocide: Australia, the USA, East Timor, 
and the Aborigines, 34 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 163, 177 (2002). 
 279. See Phil Mercer, Aborigines Dreaming of Land, BBC NEWS, Oct. 8, 2002, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2309249.stm. 
 280. Indigenous Canadians Get Apology, BBC NEWS, Jan. 8, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/world/americas/45797.stm.  See also Rosie Goldsmith, Abuse in Canada, BBC NEWS, Dec. 
28, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/americas/1091198.stm. 
 281. Karaja Indians are Exploited by Alcohol, Institute Centro de Vida, July 16, 1998, 
available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/42/091.html. 
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exploitation.282  In fact, governments throughout the Americas are 
failing in their commitment to the region’s indigenous peoples, as 
these groups remain some of the most marginalized and poverty-
stricken in the world.283  Thus, with such commonplace abuse, it has 
become increasingly vital for concerned actors on the global stage to 
keep a watchful eye on the maintenance and advancement of 
indigenous peoples’ rights. 
Without question, contemporary international thinking has 
advanced the cause of indigenous peoples.  For instance, the United 
Nations (U.N.) now has an established body—the Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues (PFII)—which serves in a consultative capacity 
to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).284  The PFII 
provides expert advice to the ECOSOC, raises awareness and 
promotes integration and coordination of indigenous-related 
activities within the U.N. system, and prepares and disseminates 
information on matters of indigenous import.285  In addition, the U.N. 
has also benefited from the efforts of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations, which drafted the “United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in 1993.286  The 
Commission on Human Rights set up an open-ended intercessional 
working group to review and expand this instrument in 1995,287 and 
after more than a decade of refinement, the Human Rights Council 
adopted a final version of the document in 2006 (Declaration).288  If 
the Declaration is adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, it will 
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28, 1994). 
 287. FACT SHEET NO. 9, supra note 286. 
 288. The Vice-President of the Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on 
the First Session of the Human Rights Council, at 58, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10 (June 30, 2006) [hereinafter Declaration]. 
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probably be the most comprehensive statement of indigenous 
peoples’ rights ever developed, as it establishes collective rights to an 
unprecedented degree in the field of international human rights law.289 
The Declaration reflects modern international thinking on the 
rights of indigenous peoples and therefore offers persuasive moral 
guidance to the United States should the Cherokees renew their 
claim.  More specifically, an examination of three pertinent articles in 
the Declaration will suffice to demonstrate its utility.  First, Article 10 
states:  “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their 
lands or territories.  No relocation shall take place without the free, 
prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and 
after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, 
with the option of return.”290  Without question, the historical 
evidence shows that the Republic of Texas forcibly removed the 
Cherokees.291  Thus, this principle was violated.  Second, the first 
paragraph of Article 28 discusses the restoration of confiscated 
property by stating: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can 
include restitution or, when this is not possible, of a just, fair and 
equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources 
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, 
and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or 
damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.292 
Pursuant to this principle, the Cherokees are entitled to recovery of 
lands that were confiscated without their consent by the Republic of 
Texas, or in the alternative, compensation for the property.  
Nevertheless, these two principles are probably inapplicable because 
they apply to actions taken by the Republic of Texas, a now-extinct 
state.  Consequently, a third section—Article 37, paragraph 1—likely 
provides the strongest guidance regarding the Cherokees’ claim:  
“Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance 
and enforcement of Treaties, Agreements and other Constructive 
Arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have 
States honour and respect such Treaties, Agreements and other 
 
 289. UNITED NATIONS GUIDE FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, LEAFLET NO. 5: THE DRAFT 
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/racism/indileaflet5.doc [hereinafter LEAFLET] (last visited Aug. 14, 
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 290. Declaration, supra note 288, art. 10. 
 291. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 190. 
 292. Declaration, supra note 288, art. 28, ¶ 1. 
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Constructive Arrangements.”293  Here, the principle is unequivocal in 
advocating that the United States honor the Treaty because it was in 
all likelihood a valid agreement when the United States annexed the 
Republic of Texas. 
Throughout U.S. history, the government has systematically 
violated the rights of Indians despite having promulgated a role of 
interaction characterized by good faith, honesty, and fair dealing.  
Regrettably, United States’ behavior is not anomalous:  similar 
incidences of mistreatment of indigenous peoples have occurred in 
Australia, Canada, and countries in Latin America.  The U.N. has 
taken a lead role on the issue of indigenous rights in recent years, and 
though it has not yet produced a binding treaty, it has contributed 
substantively to the maintenance and improvement of such rights by 
crafting the Declaration.  By applying key sections of this persuasive 
instrument to the Cherokees’ claim, the analysis concludes that there 
is a compelling moral justification for the United States to honor the 
Treaty.  Furthermore, as a leader on the world stage, the United 
States has a unique opportunity to show genuine support for the 
Declaration’s principles. 
CONCLUSION 
The Treaty executed in 1836 between the Republic of Texas and 
the Cherokees appears to have been a binding agreement.  The pact 
was properly executed by the provisional government of the Republic 
of Texas, which had the authority and obligation to treat with the 
Indians under the Plan and Powers.294  Furthermore, while the 
agreement did incorporate the Solemn Declaration,295 which granted 
territory to the Cherokees,296 the Treaty neither contained a provision 
that required Senate ratification,297 nor did the provisional 
 
 293. Id. art. 37, ¶ 1.  See generally Angela R. Hoeft, Coming Full Circle: American Indian 
Treaty Litigation from an International Human Rights Perspective, 14 LAW & INEQ. 203, 248-55 
(1995) (discussing the canons of treaty construction and their application to the agreements of 
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 294. See Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III. 
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[the Solemn Declaration] made by the last General Consultation, at St. Felipe, and dated 13th 
November A.D. 1835.”). 
 296. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 60-61.  See also JOURNALS, supra note 83, at 546-47. 
 297. See supra, Part II.A.  However, the Senate ultimately did reject the treaty.  See also 
generally Treaty, supra note 90; Plans and Powers, supra note 83, art. 3 (“They shall have power, 
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government have a mechanism by which to ratify treaties under the 
Plan and Powers.298  The simple fact is that the Republic of Texas was 
at war with a powerful nation—Mexico—and the allegiance of the 
Cherokees and affiliated tribes was believed to be critical to the 
burgeoning state if its war for independence was to succeed.299  As 
such, the Republic of Texas was bound to keep its word and honor 
the Treaty under the well known international principle—pacta sunt 
servanda—which means that agreements must be kept.300  Each party 
explicitly recognized the capacity of the other party to treat by 
entering the pact,301 and more importantly, the Republic of Texas did 
not justify abrogating the Treaty.302  For these reasons, the Treaty was 
probably valid under domestic and international law. 
The most noteworthy decision regarding the Cherokees’ claim 
issued from the ICC in 1953,303 but this administrative tribunal 
reached what was likely an inequitable outcome that was the result of 
a flawed analysis.  The ICC misinterpreted and misapplied case 
precedent, ignored key historical facts required to properly adjudicate 
the claim, and failed to consider the Treaty within the rubric of 
international law.  More particularly, the ICC’s conclusion that the 
United States did not have to succeed to the Treaty after the 
annexation of the Republic of Texas ignored three key issues:  first, 
the decision violated traditional state succession principles as codified 
in both the modern Restatement and VCSST;304 second, the decision 
cannot be reconciled with U.S. precedent concerning private property 
rights in historical cases of annexation;305 and third, the decision 
contradicted earlier policy positions on state succession promulgated 
by the United States in the international arena.306  Hence, it seems 
that the United States should have succeeded to the obligation.307 
 
 298. See Plan and Powers, supra note 83. 
 299. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 64 (explaining that the Republic of Texas wanted 
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 301. See supra text accompanying notes 166-76. 
 302. See id. 
 303. See Texas-Cherokees v. United States, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n 522, 522 (1953). 
 304. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 305. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 306. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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While the Treaty in all likelihood remains a valid instrument, 
there is another legal argument that suggests the Cherokees had 
already gained title to the land in question.  In short, the Cherokees 
probably had acquired an inchoate right to the disputed territory that 
matured into perfect title under the doctrine of adverse possession.308  
Satisfying the essential elements of this traditional rule of law bolsters 
the Cherokees’ claim to the property because even if the Treaty was 
invalid, then adverse possession provided an alternative right of title 
to the land that met both personhood and utilitarian concerns.  
Though it seems marvelous that the Cherokees could pursue a claim 
for adverse possession at this late point in time, the fact that this 
matter has long been ignored shows bad faith on the part of the 
former Republic of Texas government, the state of Texas 
government, and the U.S. government in refusing to honor the 
Treaty. 
Finally, even if one concludes that the Treaty was invalid, or in 
the alternative, that the Cherokees had no sustainable claim to the 
land under the doctrine of adverse possession, any decision that 
denies the Treaty’s validity proves difficult to reconcile for a nation 
that has held steadfast to its obligations as a fiduciary to its 
indigenous peoples since as early as 1787.309  When the putative 
fiduciary role is considered alongside the historical legal precedent, 
policy, and behavior of the United States, the decision to dishonor the 
Treaty is even more perplexing.  In fact, one can argue that by failing 
to acknowledge and honor the obligation of the former Republic of 
Texas, especially in the context of contemporary thinking on the 
rights of indigenous peoples as expressed in the Declaration,310 the 
behavior of the United States is ignominious. 
This Article is not without its faults.  Most notably, it is not 
written by a legal historian, and some students of law may argue that 
it is inappropriate—even in a scholarly pursuit—to apply modern 
codification of international law to the analysis of a historical treaty.  
However, given the exceedingly slow, almost “ablation-like” process 
by which international law evolves, the codification of doctrine 
 
Indian rights derived from a treaty could be abrogated unilaterally by Congress through 
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 308. See supra Part IV. 
 309. See generally Wiessner, supra note 147, at 571 (discussing U.S. passage of the 
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 310. See LEAFLET, supra note 289. 
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exemplified by the contemporary instruments cited in this article is at 
best a de minimis issue in the analysis of the Treaty.  All the same, 
such issues foster opportunities for students of both domestic and 
international law to offer further insight and analysis into the 
interpretation of the Treaty, not only within the context of the law 
itself, but by encouraging interest in specific cases of historical 
precedent—such as the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo—which may 
shed further light on the instrument’s validity.311  Furthermore, 
students of history and law can analogize this matter to similar cases 
of broken treaties with indigenous peoples occurring in places such as 
the United States, Australia, Canada, and Latin America.312  In the 
end, the numerous branches that one can explore serve not only to 
shed light on the Cherokees’ claim, but also can help other domestic 
and international tribes facing like circumstances better understand 
and resolve their own issues. 
The reader is the final arbiter regarding the validity of the 
Treaty, but the evidence presented in this Article lays out a cogent 
case for the Cherokees should they decide to renew their claim.  Yet, 
even if the United States recognizes the Treaty as binding, the 
unanswered question is if the government should provide restitution 
to the Cherokees in the form of federal recognition bringing federal 
money, compensation and land, or both.313  Whatever the final 
outcome, any redress should accomplish one essential objective:  it 
must help what was historically the most important tribe in the region 
save what remains of its cultural heritage. 
 
 311. See generally Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 217, 9 Stat. at 926-32 (ceding 
territory from Mexico to the United States). 
 312. For example, the Oneida Nation recently sparred with the City of Sherrill, New York, 
in the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the Tribe’s ability to assert sovereignty over its land.  
Passage of Time at Issue in Oneida Nation Case, INDIANZ.COM, January 12, 2005, 
http://www.indianz.com/news/2005/005975.asp.  Despite being recognized by a Treaty in 1794, 
the Oneida’s 300,000 acre reservation fell out of possession of the Tribe over the next two 
hundred years, and the city argued that the passage of time barred the territory from being 
labeled as “Indian Country,” which makes it free from state and local taxation.  Id. 
 313. Sutton, supra note 119, at 545. 
